Compensation Strategies That Support Commercial Banks’ Effective Risk Management Practices by Kagumya, Elias
Walden University 
ScholarWorks 
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection 
2020 
Compensation Strategies That Support Commercial Banks’ 
Effective Risk Management Practices 
Elias Kagumya 
Walden University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies 
Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an 























has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,  
and that any and all revisions required by  




Dr. Jill Murray, Committee Chairperson, Doctor of Business Administration Faculty 
 
Dr. Janet Booker, Committee Member, Doctor of Business Administration Faculty 
 




















MS, Makerere University, 2006 
BS, Makerere University, 1999 
 
 
Doctoral Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 








Compensation structures with relatively high levels of contingent pay encouraged 
managers to engage in excessive risk-taking behavior at financial institutions, which 
contributed to the global financial crisis of 2008. The purpose of this study, guided by the 
theory of the firm, was to explore compensation strategies that some executives in 
Uganda used to support effective risk-management practices. This multiple case study 
was an in-depth inquiry into compensation strategies that encouraged prudent risk-taking 
behavior. The target population comprised 5 risk-management executives from 5 separate 
commercial banks who had successfully implemented compensation strategies that 
supported risk management practices. Data were collected through semistructured 
interviews and a review of company documents. Data were analyzed using Yin’s 
approach and involved data coding, sorting, filtering, identifying relationships, 
confirming and linking emerging themes to the research question. Methodological 
triangulation and member checking were applied to ensure the credibility, validity, 
accuracy, and transferability of the results. Four themes emerged from data analysis: 
compensation challenges, financial and nonfinancial compensation, the effectiveness of 
compensation, and effective implementation of compensation strategies. The findings 
from the study may contribute to positive social change by driving the adoption of 
compensation strategies that motivate leaders to focus on the long-term objectives of the 
firm, including investing in socially responsive projects that improve the welfare of the 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
Background of the Problem 
Regulators and market participants in the financial services sector have suggested 
that poor compensation structures of top managers encouraged excessive managerial risk-
taking that caused the financial crisis of 2008 (Cheng, Hong, & Scheinkman, 2015; Tóth, 
2016). In response to the financial crisis, regulators passed legislation that aligns 
executive pay with the interests of debtors, creditors, customers, and shareholders 
(Guthrie, Kwon, & Sokolowsky, 2015; Trendowski & Rustambekov, 2017; von Ehrlich 
& Radulescu, 2016). After the financial crisis of 2008, some loss-making banks and 
beneficiaries of bail-out funds from governments paid bonuses to top managers contrary 
to risk management guidelines on pay-for-performance (Schenck & Thornton, 2016; 
Tóth, 2016). Top management compensation in many loss-making banks stayed the same 
or increased, emphasizing the conflict between compensation, risk, and firm performance 
(Boodoo, 2018; Eufinger & Gill, 2016). Since 2008, incentive-driven scandals involving 
product misselling, benchmark rate-rigging, earnings management, and rogue trading 
underscore the need to implement effective risk management practices in the financial 
services sector (West, 2016; Witman, 2018; Yasser & Soliman, 2018). In this study, I 
explored the compensation strategies that executives of financial institutions implement 
to support effective risk management practices and meet stakeholder expectations.  
Problem Statement 
Financial regulators maintain that compensation structures with relatively high 
amounts of contingent pay encouraged managers to engage in excessive risk-taking 
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behavior at financial institutions, which contributed to the global financial crisis of 2008 
(Brink, Hobson, & Stevens, 2017). Ninety-three percent of Standard & Poor 1500 firms 
surveyed from 2009 to 2013 preferred short-term incentive awards that encourage 
excessive risk-taking to structures that align with the long-term interests of shareholders 
(John Harry, Gao, Hwang, & Wu, 2018). The general business problem was that some 
executives in the banking sector do not implement effective risk management practices 
for compensation strategies, leading to poor financial performance. The specific business 
problem was that some commercial banking executives in Uganda lack compensation 
strategies that support effective risk management practices. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore compensation 
strategies that some executives in Uganda use to support effective risk management 
practices. The targeted population comprised chief risk officers of five global commercial 
banks in Uganda with success in implementing compensation strategies that support risk 
management practices. The findings from this study might contribute to building 
awareness about compensation strategies that support effective risk management 
practices in the banking sector in Uganda. Findings from this study might also have 
positive social benefits including (a) protection of depositors’ funds, (b) improving 
financial inclusion by extending affordable financial services to businesses and 
individuals, (c) inculcating a good savings and investment culture, and (d) improving the 
welfare of the communities that the banks serve. 
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Nature of the Study 
Qualitative research enables researchers to focus on the in-depth understanding of 
human experiences, concerns, concepts, ideas, and meanings regarding a phenomenon 
(Van den Berg & Struwig, 2017). For this study, I used qualitative research because it 
allowed me to use open-ended questions and obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon in its natural conditions. In contrast, quantitative researchers seek to identify 
and isolate measurable variables of a phenomenon to determine relationships, causality, 
and predictability in controlled conditions (Onen, 2016; Park & Park 2016). The 
quantitative method of inquiry was not appropriate for this study because I did not seek to 
identify and isolate variables to establish correlation, relationships, and causality. 
Researchers use the mixed-methods approach to inquire into a phenomenon by 
combining elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (Venkatesh, 
Brown, & Sullivan, 2016). The mixed-methods approach was not appropriate for this 
study because I did not examine relationships among executives’ experiences or test 
hypotheses, which are part of the mixed-methods approach.  
The three relevant research designs I considered for this study included the case 
study, phenomenological, and ethnography. I used the case study research design to 
conduct an in-depth inquiry into the phenomenon within its real-life setting using 
different types and sources of evidence simultaneously (Yin, 2018). Using the multiple 
case study design enables researchers to ensure internal validity and the replication of 
findings across multiple firms within the same industry (Larrinaga, 2016). I used a 
multiple case study design to explore the diverse compensation strategies that participants 
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use to support effective risk management practices. Although the phenomenological 
approach enables researchers to explore participants’ lived experiences, recollections, and 
interpretations to gain insights into a phenomenon (Yin, 2018), the purpose of the study 
was not to explore how participants experience the study phenomenon. Further, using 
ethnographic research enables researchers to explore the culture or social world of a 
people or ethnic group by observing the group’s everyday behaviors (Hoolachan, 2015), 
which did not fit the examination of compensation strategies that support effective risk 
management practices. 
Research Question 
The overarching research question for the study was, “What compensation 
strategies do some executives in Uganda use to support effective risk management 
practices?” 
Interview Questions 
1. What risks, if any, does your organization face from its compensation 
strategies? 
2. What compensation strategies have you implemented to support effective risk 
management practices? 
3. How do you measure the effectiveness of these compensation strategies? 
4. What were the key challenges your organization encountered when 
implementing these compensation strategies? 




6. What additional information would you like to share concerning compensation 
strategies and effective risk management practices? 
Conceptual Framework 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the theory of the firm, which suggests that 
firms incur losses when managers engage in activities contrary to owners’ interests. The 
theory of the firm provides a framework to explore the connection between pay-for-
performance incentives and managers’ risk-taking behavior (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
Fama (1980) advanced the theory of the firm to contribute to the concept of separation of 
ownership and control as an efficient form of corporate governance. Additionally, 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) applied the theory of the firm to how optimal financial 
structures of firms drive compensation strategies for incentivizing managers. For 
instance, deferred compensation schemes encourage managers to take high risks contrary 
to owners’ and debtholders’ interests (Dhole, Manchiraju, & Suk, 2015). Thus, previous 
researchers have demonstrated that the theory of the firm is a suitable conceptual 
framework for understanding how compensation strategies shape executives’ risk-taking 
behavior (Bellavitis, Kamuriwo, & Hommel, 2017; Clifford & Lindsey, 2016). I used the 
theory to explore compensation strategies that support risk management practices by 
appreciating how incentive schemes can align the conflicting interests of managers, 
owners, and other stakeholders. 
Operational Definitions 
Compensation strategy: A compensation strategy is a reward package comprising 
basic salary bonus or stock awards that organizations use to recognize employee 
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performance over a period (Bouslah, Linares-Zegarra, M’Zali, & Scholtens, 2017; 
Ghosh, Rai, Chauhan, Baranwal, & Srivastava, 2016). 
Corporate governance: Corporate governance is a set of rules, norms, guidelines, 
and structures that define the roles, responsibilities, and expectations between the various 
stakeholders of a firm including managers, owners, and regulators (Anginer, Demirguc-
Kunt, Huizinga, & Ma, 2016; Kusi, Gyeke-Dako, Agbloyor, & Darku, 2017). 
Enterprise-wide risk management (ERM) frameworks: ERM frameworks are the 
two main risk management programs, including the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) framework and the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 31000 standard (Karanja, 2017; Karanja, 2016). 
Regulatory guidelines: Regulatory guidelines are a set of laws, rules, regulations, 
and accounting standards that regulators use to enforce prudent risk management 
practices in the financial services sector (Financial Institutions Act, 2004; Guthrie et al., 
2015; Ozdemir, 2018).  
Risk management practices: Risk management practices are a proactive, 
continuous, and systematic process of identifying, assessing, measuring, and mitigating 
material events that may prevent the organization from achieving its objectives 
(Anderson, 2017; Anju & Uma, 2017). 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
A researcher must discuss the assumptions, any threats to the conceptual 
framework or conclusions, and any intentional biases and constraints in the study (Neal 
Kimball & Turner, 2018). In the following subsections, I discuss the assumptions, 
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limitations, and delimitations in my study as well as the strategies that I employed to 
minimize the impact on the research findings. 
Assumptions 
Assumptions are beliefs, perspectives, or unverifiable facts about a phenomenon 
that have a significant impact on the validity of the research findings (Nkwake & 
Morrow, 2016). In this study, I assumed that the population size would comprise of 
participants who had successfully implemented compensation strategies that support 
effective risk management strategies. I also assumed that the five global commercial 
banks in Uganda would allow their chief risk officers to participate in the study. Another 
assumption was that the participants would respond to the interview questions truthfully, 
honestly, and without bias. I also assumed that the collection and analysis of multiple 
sources of data was the best approach for data collection for this study. Finally, I assumed 
that the data would satisfy the validity and reliability requirements of the research 
findings and conclusions. 
Limitations 
Limitations are threats to the internal validity of a study including insufficient or 
imprecise information, bias, inconsistencies, or unknown consistencies that are beyond 
the control of the researcher (Farooq, 2017). Researchers identify limitations and explain 
their impact on the research findings to demonstrate rigor and provide direction for future 
research (Greener, 2018). A limitation of this multiple case study was that the sample size 
might not represent all commercial banks in Uganda. Another limitation was that 
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participants might withhold certain information that banks consider competitive and may 
not respond to the interview questions honestly and truthfully. 
Delimitations 
Delimitations are biases, constraints, or boundaries that a researcher introduces to 
limit the scope, making it more manageable to undertake the study (Cassiano & Borges-
Andrade, 2017). A delimitation of the study was the restriction of the geographical 
location to Uganda. I only interviewed participants from five global commercial banks in 
Uganda that have a good record of adopting leading practices in compensation strategies 
and risk management. Another delimitation of the study was that only chief risk officers 
of the commercial banks participated in the study. 
Significance of the Study 
Regulators and investors in the financial services sector maintain that one of the 
causes of the global financial crisis of 2008 was excessive risk-taking by managers in 
pursuit of higher profits and personal gain (Zaring, 2017). The findings from this study 
might increase awareness and contribute to the adoption of compensation strategies that 
support effective risk management practices in the banking industry.  
Contribution to Business Practice 
Financial crises and weak financial systems affect banks through financial losses, 
regulatory fines, and loss of key staff and customers (Ahmed & Ndayisaba, 2016). Better 
awareness and adoption of effective compensation strategies might strengthen internal 
control processes in banks by aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests (Paletta & 
Alimehmeti, 2016). Findings from this study might increase awareness regarding 
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compensation strategies that encourage managers to take prudent risk management 
decisions and inform the design and implementation of effective compensation 
regulations and processes in banks. Sustainable reforms in compensation structures by 
regulators are essential to strengthen the governance and risk management practices in 
banks (Ali & Teulon, 2017). 
Implications for Social Change 
Organizations that incorporate corporate social performance targets in executive 
compensation structures prioritize corporate social responsibility objectives (Maas, 
2016). The findings from this study might increase awareness and the adoption of 
compensation strategies that motivate managers to prioritize corporate social 
responsibility objectives for the benefit of the communities. These strategies can 
contribute to strengthening risk management practices in banks. Stable and financially 
sound banks can benefit society by investing in socially responsive projects in key public 
services such as health, education, infrastructure, and sports—improving the welfare of 
the communities in which they operate. 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
The purpose of this study was to explore the compensation strategies that some 
commercial bank executives in Uganda use to support effective risk management 
practices. For this purpose, I reviewed professional and academic literature to gain an in-
depth understanding of the interaction between compensation strategies and effective risk 
management practices. I used Walden University’s library search tools to identify 
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relevant sources including peer-reviewed journal articles, books, and government 
websites.  
Literature Review Strategy 
I used Walden University’s library search tools and Google Scholar to access 
several search engines including Thoreau Discovery Service, Business Source Complete, 
SAGE Research, and EBSCOhost Methods. The primary search terms included 
compensation strategies and financial institutions, compensation and financial crisis, 
Remuneration and financial crisis, COSO Risk Management, ISO 31000 Risk 
Management, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Effective Risk Management, and 
Lapses in risk management. The databases that I accessed included ABI/INFORM 
Global, ABI/INFORM Collection, Academic Search Complete, Business Source 
Complete, Complementary Index, EBSCO, ProQuest Central, and ScienceDirect. The 
search yielded 295 articles relevant to this study. Out of the 295 articles, 287 (97.3%) 
were peer-reviewed in compliance with the 85% rule, whereas 280 articles (94.9%) are 
within the past 5 years from the date of graduation. 
The literature review contains four main categories: (a) conceptual framework, (b) 
alternative theories, (c) risk management practices, and (d) compensation strategies. The 
review begins with an analysis of the theory of the firm, which was the conceptual 
framework of the study. I also discuss alternative theories including the agency theory, 
stewardship theory, prospect theory, and earnings management theory. A review of risk 
management practices follows including ERM frameworks, regulatory guidelines, 
corporate governance practices, and managerial risk-taking behavior. I also explore 
11 
 
compensation strategies that commercial bank executives implement with a focus on the 
principles underlying compensation, compensation and firm performance, compensation, 
and managerial risk-taking, and managing compensation risk. 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this study was the theory of the firm, which was 
suitable for studying the conflicting interests of stakeholders in a firm and the role of 
compensation in shaping managerial risk-taking behavior (Bellavitis et al., 2017; Clifford 
& Lindsey, 2016). Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the theory of the firm by 
drawing insights from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights, and the theory 
of finance. The theory of the firm helps explore why managers in firms with debt and 
equity holders undertake riskier projects and why highly regulated banks have high debt-
equity ratios (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kim, Patro, & Pereira, 2016). For a given size of 
firm, the theory determines the total market value of the firm as (a) inside equity held by 
the manager, (b) outside equity held by outsiders, and (c) debt in the firm held by 
managers and outsiders (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The theory suggests 
that in perfect market conditions, the prices of debt and outside equity will reflect the 
high agency costs as managers engage in activities contrary to the interests of creditors 
and shareholders (Guthrie et al., 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to the 
theory of the firm, managers with no controlling interest in the firm make decisions that 
appeal to their short-term interests, yet creditors and shareholders rely on the contractual 
agency relationship to protect their rights (Kang & Kim, 2016; Van Bekkum, 2016). 
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Corporate governance structures that emphasize the separation of ownership from control 
are effective in protecting the interests of outside stakeholders (Fama, 1980). 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) posited that firms could drive managerial long-term 
risk-taking behavior by implementing a range of compensation strategies including 
salary, bonuses, stock options, deferred and negative incentive practices. For example, 
debt-like compensation incentives including pension and deferred payments, motivate 
managers to reduce risk by aligning the managers’ and creditors’ reward expectations 
because they both rely on a promise for payment in the future (Kang & Kim, 2016). 
Firms that offer debt-like incentives encourage managers to become risk-averse because 
such incentives are unsecured and subject to a high risk of default when the firm’s 
financial performance is poor (Van Bekkum, 2016). Deferred and negative incentives can 
help align managers’ expectations with the long-term goals of the shareholders (Dhole et 
al., 2015). It is important for firms to implement effective employee retention policies, as 
managers would not sacrifice short-term rewards by selecting long-term projects for the 
benefit of future managers (Koch, Waggoner, & Wall, 2017). Firms can implement 
incentive schemes to encourage sensible managerial risk-taking behavior (Dewatripont & 
Tirole, 1994).  
Alternative Theories 
Agency theorists have complemented the theory of the firm by suggesting that the 
contractual relationship between the principal and the agent ensures the alignment of the 
conflicting expectations of all stakeholders of the firm (Cheng et al., 2015; Nguyen, 
Boateng, & Nguyen, 2017). For instance, commercial banks have several stakeholders 
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with conflicting objectives, and pay-for-performance incentives might influence 
managers’ to focus on increasing their wealth to the detriment of owners, creditors, and 
the public (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). The stewardship theory, prospect theory, and 
earnings management theory augment the theory of the firm in exploring how firms could 
use compensation strategies to align the goals of managers, creditors and debtors with the 
long-term objectives of shareholders (Crocker & Slemrod, 2008; Le Breton-Miller & 
Miller, 2018; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Agency theory. Agency theory supplements the theory of the firm by suggesting 
that when a firm’s organizational structure comprises managers who are not owners, 
managers do not always work in the best interest of the shareholders (Nguyen et al., 
2017). Agency theory stems from the works of Adam Smith of 1776 to inform 
subsequent theorists including Ross (1973), who argued that poor incentives fueled the 
agency problem, and Mitnick (1975), who considered poor institutional structures the 
source of agency risk. Ross observed that an agency relationship exists when managers 
act as agents on behalf of owners to manage and deliver an acceptable return to the 
shareholders in exchange for a reward. The misalignment of interests arises when owners 
entrust their capital with managers in expectation of satisfactory returns, but the 
managers prioritize their interests (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Agency theorists argue that 
economic rationality, self-interest, and moral hazard are the key causes of managers’ self-
seeking behavior (Evans & Tourish, 2016). Organizational leaders can mitigate the 
agency problem by designing compensation structures that align with the managers’ 
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ethical values to encourage prudent managerial risk-taking behavior (Chng & Wang, 
2016). 
A key limitation of agency theory is that managerial opportunism is not the only 
cause of the agency problem (Francoeur, Melis, Gaia, & Aresu, 2015). Agency theorists 
have assumed that economic self-interest is the sole influence of managerial risk-taking 
behavior, which does not consider intrinsic factors including self-actualization, 
recognition, and growth (Evans & Tourish, 2016). The contractual agency relationship 
emphasizes extrinsic motivation, fosters suspicion, and merits individual effort at the 
expense of team success (Eisenhardt, 1988). Thus, the agency contract does not address 
the agency problem due to other challenges including information asymmetry, economic 
rationality, fraud, and transaction costs (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). 
Regardless of limitations with agency theory, the theory of the firm and the 
agency theory help advocate for the implementation of compensation strategies that meet 
the intrinsic goals of managers (Kang & Kim, 2016). Managers with intrinsic goals, such 
as caring for the environment, prioritize intrinsic rewards ahead of monetary gain 
(Francoeur et al., 2015). Subsequent agency theorists have advocated for the 
implementation of compensation strategies that motivate managers to increase the firm’s 
performance in a manner that maximizes both shareholder and manager wealth (Nguyen 
et al., 2017; Panda & Leepsa, 2017). In situations of uncertainty, firms need to implement 
pay-for-performance structures that protect the principal’s interests as well as motivate 
managers to take the appropriate risk (Ross, 1973).  
15 
 
The agency theory sets the foundation for effective objective setting, performance 
measurement, and reward systems in firms to ensure the long-term alignment of interests 
between owners, creditors, and managers (Evans & Tourish, 2016). Firms that implement 
effective corporate governance structures with a clear separation of roles between 
ownership and management are more likely to satisfy all stakeholders’ interests (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). The effective implementation of corporate governance structures, board 
oversight, and assurance are key tenets in addressing the agency problem (Mitnick, 
1975). Agency theory anchors the theory of the firm as a useful framework for exploring 
the causes of the agency problem and the role of compensation strategies in aligning the 
interests of the firm’s various stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). 
The stewardship theory. The stewardship theory is an alternative option to the 
theory of the firm in exploring the drivers of managerial risk-taking behavior (Francoeur 
et al., 2015). The stewardship theory maintains that firms can implement strategies that 
drive an acceptable level of trust, discipline, and risk preference of their managers (Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2018). Agency theorists assume that individual goals motivate 
managers’ risk preferences in an agency relationship, but stewardship theorists argue that 
managers are stewards who protect the interests of the owners (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997). According to stewardship theory, stewards seek higher profits, 
dividends, and share prices for shareholders, which means the stewards ultimately receive 
higher compensation as a reward for good performance (Davis et al., 1997; Ivanova, 
2016). Thus, there is a strong positive relationship between the success of the 
organization and that of the stakeholders because protecting the owners’ interests through 
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better firm performance maximizes a steward’s compensation package (Davis et al., 
1997; Kota, 2018). Further, stewardship theorists emphasize the importance of intangible 
factors such as success, association, and self-actualization (Davis et al., 1997; Le Breton-
Miller & Miller, 2018). Stewards willingly subjugate their interests to protect the 
long‐term welfare of other stakeholders (Ivanova, 2016; Kota, 2018).  
The stewardship theory advances the agency theory in proposing that when 
managers focus on achieving entity-wide objectives ahead of self-interests, firms begin to 
find solutions to the agency problem sustainably (Francoeur et al., 2015). According to 
the agency theory, directors are self-seekers without regard for the interests of the other 
stakeholders in the absence of accountability (Bacq & Eddleston, 2016; Keay, 2016), 
whereas stewardship theorists note that when directors are accountable, they execute their 
roles with honesty, trustworthiness, and professionalism in pursuit of entity-wide 
objectives (Ivanova, 2016; Keay, 2016; Kota, 2018). According to the stewardship 
theory, firms need to focus on good governance and accountability as well as implement 
compensation strategies that appeal to the directors’ sense of responsibility in embracing 
entity-wide values (Bacq & Eddleston, 2016; Keay, 2016; Mitnick, 1975). Thus, firms 
need to implement effective risk management practices that foster accountability and 
transparency and implement appropriate compensation strategies to mitigate agency risk 
(Bellavitis et al., 2017; Clifford & Lindsey, 2016; Nguyen et al., 2017). For example, 
performance incentives that encourage an entity-centered culture help firms to improve 
financial performance ahead of strategies that appeal to an employee-centered culture 
(Bacq & Eddleston, 2016; Kota, 2018).  
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According to the stewardship theory, effective governance practices promote a 
culture of transparency in financial reporting protecting the interests of prospective 
investors and creditors (Kota, 2018). Conflicts of interest are a signal to investors for lack 
of accountability, ineffective risk oversight, and poor risk management practices 
(Ivanova, 2016). The principles underlying the stewardship theory including devotion to 
entity goals, honesty, trustworthiness, and professionalism by the managers significantly 
reduce agency costs and appeal to investors (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2018). The 
stewardship theory also emphasizes discipline, trust, professionalism, loyalty, good 
governance, prudent risk management, and accountability in driving managerial risk-
taking behavior beyond compensation (Keay, 2016; Mitnick, 1975). 
The stewardship theory and the agency theory both emphasize the role of 
effective risk management practices, corporate governance, and compensation strategies 
in aligning the conflicting objectives of a firm’s stakeholders (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 
2018; Panda & Leepsa, 2017). However, agency theorists suggest the limitations of the 
stewardship theory in explaining managers’ behavior, noting that managers are human, 
unpredictable, and are likely to act selfishly (Keay, 2016). But, for example, high levels 
of trust reduce agency costs in family-owned firms if the owners implement effective 
corporate governance structures (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2018). Founder-run firms 
and social enterprises exhibit lower agency costs by adopting the stewardship principles 
and could benefit more by implementing effective governance and risk management 
practices (Bacq & Eddleston, 2016; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2018). Further, both the 
stewardship and agency theories emphasize the role of personal characteristics such as 
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values, honesty, sacrifice in addition to the implementation of effective compensation 
strategies in managing agency risk (Kota, 2018; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2018). Thus, 
the stewardship theory complements the agency theory and provides an alternative 
framework to the theory of the firm in exploring the principles that may motivate 
managers to focus on entity-wide objectives ahead of self-interests (Davis et al., 1997; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). 
The prospect theory. The main principle underlying the prospect theory is an 
emphasis on change in wealth rather than absolute levels in wealth driving stakeholder 
behavior in the firm (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 1999). Under the prospect theory, 
managers take risks by considering the acts, contingencies, and outcomes that are 
relevant to the decision (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The prospect theory departs from 
agency theory and stewardship theory by proposing that managers who are more risk-
averse for high-probability gains are less risk-seeking for gains of low probability 
(Barberis et al., 1999). The theory emphasizes the role of loss aversion in defining 
managerial risk-taking behavior by noting that the possibility of a reduction in the 
manager’s wealth is likely to attract the manager’s attention more than an increase 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
The prospect theory complements the theory of the firm in acknowledging that 
monetary incentives may drive better performance with no significant impact on the 
managers’ level of sacrifice, dedication, honesty, and professionalism (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Prospect theorists also agree with agency theorists that investors 
derive utility from the increase in the value of their wealth as the agent’s risk-taking 
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behavior increases (Barberis et al., 1999). The prospect theory as a descriptive model 
complements the theory of the firm in explaining the violations of the rational utility 
function and by exploring the key drivers of a manager’s risk-taking behavior (Pogach, 
2018; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
The earnings management theory. Earnings management theorists have drawn 
insights from other behavioral theories to explain why managers engage in earnings 
management (Francoeur et al., 2015; Jiraporn, Miller, Yoon, & Kim, 2006). The earnings 
management theory departs from the agency theory by noting that compensation 
structures that rely on reported earnings cannot incentivize managers to improve earnings 
as well as report financial performance honestly (Jiraporn et al., 2006; Keay, 2016). 
According to the earnings management theory, an optimal compensation contract reflects 
a tradeoff between incentivizing managers to maximize firm earnings and discouraging 
managers from falsifying financial statements (Crocker & Slemrod, 2008). A degree of 
earnings management is a necessary part of a pay-for-performance compensation 
structure to align the incentives of managers with the interests of owners (Evans & 
Tourish, 2016). Managers can engage in earnings management to convey private 
information and enhance information content relevant in strengthening earnings, which 
increases stockholder-value (Jiraporn et al., 2006). Additionally, where agency costs are 
high, earnings management is unsustainable because managers work to enhance their 
private wealth (Crocker & Slemrod, 2008; Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Both agency and 
earnings management theories discourage the opportunistic use of earnings management 
in cases where a misalignment of incentives motivates managers to take advantage of the 
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flexibility in the accounting rules distort reported earnings for personal gain (Jiraporn et 
al., 2006; Nguyen et al., 2017). 
Risk Management Practices 
In this subsection, I explore leading risk management practices in the financial 
services sector including ERM frameworks, regulatory guidelines, corporate governance 
practices, and managerial risk-taking behavior. 
Enterprise-wide risk management frameworks. Ogutu, Bennett, and Olawoyin 
(2018) highlighted the two main approaches to risk management including traditional risk 
management and ERM. Traditional risk management focuses on risks that could result in 
losses while ERM considers all potential risks across the entity including non-financial 
risks. Firms adopting traditional risk management manage risks using a decentralized 
approach ignoring the value in the relationship between various risks across distinct 
functions (Ahmed & Ndayisaba, 2016). The two main ERM frameworks that firms adopt 
in implementing effective risk management practices include the COSO framework and 
the ISO 31000 standard (Karanja, 2017; Karanja, 2016). The two frameworks address 
challenges in the traditional risk management approach and serve as a reference guide for 
firms seeking to meet their strategic objectives while implementing effective risk 
management practices and complying with regulatory requirements (Karanja, 2016).  
The COSO framework, initially published in 2004 and revised in 2017, comprises 
of five components including (a) governance and culture, (b) strategy and objective-
setting, (c) performance, (d) review and revision, and (e) information (COSO, 2017). The 
framework underscores the need for firms to align strategy formulation and 
21 
 
implementation with the implementation of effective risk management practices. 
Callahan and Soileau (2017) noted that the implementation of the COSO framework 
enables firms to integrate risk management practices across the entity and to mitigate 
excessive risk-taking by managers. The COSO framework helps firms to manage 
potential crises while taking advantage of opportunities by aligning risk management 
processes with performance management (COSO, 2017). The ISO 31000 standard, 
originally published in 2009 and revised in 2018, aims at standardizing the strategic and 
operational risk management practices of firms enabling them to implement effective risk 
management practices (ISO, 2018). Sitnikov, Bocean, Berceanu, and Pirvu (2017) 
posited that the ISO 31000:2017 standard underscores the role of top management in 
implementing the necessary governance structures, processes, and internal controls to 
mitigate excessive managerial risk-taking behavior.  
The ISO 31000:2017 standard provides high-level guidance on the identification, 
measurement, control, and reporting of a firms’ risks (ISO, 2018). The ISO 31000: 2017 
standard provides the foundation for implementing the concept of risk-based thinking, 
which is the focus of the ISO 9001: 2015 standard (ISO, 2018; Sitnikov et al., 2017). 
Firms that adopt the risk-based thinking approach under ISO 9001:2015 empower 
managers to make rational risk management decisions in the interest of the investors 
(Sitnikov et al., 2017).  
Firms that adopt leading risk management practices such as COSO, ISO 
31000:2017 standard, and the ISO 9001: 2015 standard manage their risks effectively as 
well as exploit opportunities to achieve positive outcomes for the shareholders (Karanja, 
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2017; Karanja, 2016). Callahan and Soileau (2017) noted that firms with a mature ERM 
culture record higher earnings, return on assets, return on equity than their industry peers 
to the benefit of all the stakeholders. Oluwagbemiga, Isaiah, and Esiemogie (2016) 
posited that ERM practices including risk limits, risk appetite, and risk strategy business 
leaders, restrain excessive managerial risk-taking behavior resulting in positive financial 
performance. ERM frameworks enhance traditional risk management practices by 
providing firms with an opportunity to manage both financial and non-financial risks 
(Ogutu et al., 2018). Firms that adopt ERM frameworks focus on increasing long-term 
shareholder value by complying with legal and regulatory requirements as the foundation 
for effective risk management (Dabari & Saidin, 2016). Liff and Wahlstrom (2017) 
argued that ERM frameworks complement regulatory supervision processes in avoiding 
bank failures and maintaining stability in the financial sector. ERM frameworks assure 
investors, creditors, and customers, which reduces the cost of capital as well as earnings 
and price stock volatility (Ogutu et al., 2018).  
Karanja (2016) cautioned that firms with poor ERM practices could not 
effectively identify and manage entity-wide risks leading to poor performance and 
regulatory sanction. Ciocîrlan (2017) observed that the three lines of defense model, 
which is a key tenet of ERM frameworks, failed to support firms in managing their risks 
during the financial crisis of 2008 due to inept implementation. Liff and Wahlstrom 
(2017) indicated that the ineffective implementation of ERM frameworks encouraged 
excessive risk-taking resulting in bank failures for banks with risk management practices 
certified by regulatory bodies. Executives responsible for implementing ERM 
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frameworks need to justify the high cost of managing risk by articulating the value of 
implementing effective risk management practices (ISO, 2018). The ISO 31000: 2017 
standard notes that as risk management practices evolve firms need to align assurance 
activities including risk management, compliance, and governance, with optimizing the 
cost of implementing risk management practices.  
Effective implementation of ERM frameworks requires firms to adopt the 
balanced scorecard tool to track their performance against the approved risk appetite as 
well as appoint a chief risk officer responsible for implementing the firm’s framework 
(Karanja, 2017; Karanja, E, 2016). Ahmed and Ndayisaba (2016) posited that the key 
features of an effective ERM framework include a mature risk culture, voluntary 
compliance, transparency in sharing risk information, competent staff, and top 
management support for risk matters. In the absence of top management commitment to 
provide adequate financial resources, the ERM program is bound to fail (Dabari & 
Saidin, 2016). Ogutu et al. (2018) indicated that the main component of successful ERM 
frameworks is risk governance because it defines responsibilities, authority, 
accountability, rules, and procedures for making risk management decisions in a firm. In 
implementing ERM frameworks, firms need to adopt compensation strategies that foster 
accountability and reward prudent managerial risk-taking behavior (Gatzert & Schmit, 
2015). Oluwagbemiga et al. (2016) underscored the need for firms to regularly review 
and enhance their ERM frameworks for adequacy, effectiveness, efficiency, and 
relevance because of the changing operating environment. 
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Regulatory guidelines. Ozdemir (2018) argued that risk management practices 
emerged out of the need to comply with regulatory requirements and evolved with 
subsequent regulations such as Basel III and accounting standards requiring proactive 
risk management capabilities. Storer (2016) questioned regulatory approaches to risk 
culture and emphasized the need to focus on ethics, training, stress testing, scenario 
thinking, compensation, and consequence management. McCormack and Deacon (2017) 
advised regulators to ensure that firms define the appropriate behavioral expectations and 
monitor to ensure compliance with the set risk culture. Regulators are responsible for 
ensuring the implementation of effective risk management practices by setting the 
benchmark for acceptable risk-taking behavior across the financial services sector 
(McCormack & Deacon, 2017; Ozdemir 2018). Financial services regulators recommend 
that firms constitute compensation committees responsible for ensuring that managers’ 
incentives align with the banks’ culture, long-term goals, risk appetite, performance, and 
the control environment (Correa & Lel, 2016). 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, regulators and governments implemented 
rescue policies including the troubled asset relief program and other bailout strategies to 
minimize the impact of the crisis on the financial services sector (Hett & Schmidt, 2017; 
Schenck & Thornton, 2016). Zardkoohi, Kang, Fraser, and Cannella (2016) argued that 
despite the good intentions of the bailout interventions the policies incentivized managers 
to adopt risky strategies because their compensation structures remained the same. 
Schenck and Thornton (2016) posited that government bailout plans increased the moral 
hazard of managers to take excessive risk encouraged by incentive structures that focused 
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on meeting short-term accounting returns. Zardkoohi et al. (2016) advised regulators and 
governments to address this moral hazard by implementing claw-back provisions in 
executive compensation to encourage managers to take a long-term view of risk. Hett and 
Schmidt (2017) cautioned that where investors, creditors, and customers consider a high 
possibility of bailing out a firm in a crisis, there is less vigilance, risk oversight, and 
control. The indirect costs of bailouts could outweigh the gains from managing a 
systemic risk situation, emphasizing the need for regulators and governments to mitigate 
the moral hazard problem by reforming the troubled firm rescue policies (Schenck & 
Thornton, 2016; Zardkoohi et al., 2016). 
Wright, Sheedy, and Magee (2016) underscored the need for regulators across 
different jurisdictions to coordinate and harmonize the introduction and implementation 
of regulatory guidelines due to the interconnectedness of the global financial system. The 
lack of consensus among regulators and governments partly explains the incomplete 
implementation of regulatory reforms in some large financial centers and the adoption of 
leading risk management practices in emerging markets (Storer, 2016). Danışoğlu, 
Güner, and Ayaydın Hacıömeroğlu (2017) cautioned regulators against ignoring country 
or industry-specific factors when implementing regulatory reforms because such factors 
influence risk-taking behavior in varying ways across different jurisdictions. Guthrie et 
al. (2015) noted that in response to the increase in the cost of earnings overstatements 
following the implementation of the Sarbanes– Oxley Act of 2002, firms in the U.S. 




Regulators in the financial services sector are adopting compensation reforms 
such as clawback rules that encourage managers to make long-term optimal risk decisions 
(Adesina & Mwamba, 2016). Kolm, Laux, and Lóránth (2016) argued that compensation 
and capital regulation could help disincentive managers from selecting risky projects by 
reducing managers’ and shareholders’ risk-shifting behavior. Eufinger and Gill (2016) 
posited that compensation structures that align managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
reduce risk-taking incentives, improve the firm’s cost of borrowing, optimize incentive-
based capital requirements, and increase shareholder value. Lim and Yong (2016) posited 
that stringent Basel II regulations encouraged managers of smaller corporate banking 
businesses to engage in income smoothing activities by delaying loan loss provisioning. 
Chang and Talley (2017) cautioned that higher capital charges negatively restrain growth 
ambitions, profitability, and sustainability for smaller banks encouraging excessive risk-
taking behavior for such firms to stay in business. Financial regulators need to implement 
mechanisms that identify the unintended consequences of regulatory guidelines and take 
appropriate action (Guthrie et al., 2015). 
The regulator of commercial banks in Uganda restrains the distribution of 
dividends or other distributions from profits or reserves for banks that do not meet or 
unlikely to meet the prudential minimum capital requirements (Financial Institutions Act, 
2004). In cases where the financial institution is undercapitalized, the regulator restricts 
banks from awarding any compensation to directors and officers in the form of bonuses, 
salary increments, emoluments and other benefits (Financial Institutions (Amendment 
Act), 2016). The regulator informed the banks of the need to adopt international financial 
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reporting standard (IFRS) 9 for assessing provisioning adequacy for potential loan losses 
in line with international best practices (Bank of Uganda, 2017). The regulator is 
evaluating the potential impact of the standard on capital adequacy and credit growth and 
would issue implementation guidelines in due course. 
Corporate governance. Anginer et al. (2016) described corporate governance as 
a set of rules, norms, and guidelines that firms implement in defining roles and 
responsibilities between managers and owners. Kusi et al. (2017) posited that corporate 
governance frameworks provide a structure which guides the conduct of owners and 
managers in determining and implementing the firm’s goals and objectives. The 
components of a good corporate governance framework include separation of roles and 
responsibilities between managers and owners, board independence, risk management 
oversight committees, audit committees, and independent remuneration committees 
(Kumari, Pattanayak, 2017). Outa and Waweru (2016) posited that corporate governance 
mechanisms mitigate agency risk by aligning the interests of all stakeholders of a firm 
including managers, owners, creditors, suppliers, customers, and the public. Maxfield, 
Wang, and de Sousa (2018) argued that corporate governance reforms following the 
financial crisis of 2008 led to the increase in loss provisions, enhancement of capital 
buffers, reduction in net interest margins, and restrained managers from undertaking risky 
projects. The presence of independent board members, the separation of ownership from 
management and the setting of fixed compensation for executives, encouraged managers 
to select less risky mergers and acquisition transactions after the financial crisis (Teti, 
Dell’Acqua, Etro, & Volpe, 2017).  
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Good corporate governance practices including an independent board, board 
members’ expertise, and experience strengthen internal control, and risk management 
practices in firms (Nalukenge, Tauringana, & Mpeera Ntayi, 2016). Słomka-Gołębiowska 
and Urbanek (2016) noted that independent board committees with few and competent 
members are effective at monitoring performance and restraining excessive risk-taking 
behavior by moderating executive compensation. Ahmed and Ndayisaba (2017) posited 
that board independence and managers’ long-term variable compensation structures 
reduce the level of managerial risk-taking behavior and increase shareholder value. 
Oyerogba, Alade, Idode, and Oluyinka (2017) underscored the positive impact of board 
oversight committees including audit and risk on the financial performance of listed 
companies in Nigeria. Kanapathippillai, Mihret, and Johl (2017) noted that effective 
remuneration committees take accountability for fair remuneration decisions and foster a 
culture of transparency in disclosing executive remuneration decisions to external 
stakeholders of the firm. Firms with effective board committees in emerging markets did 
not pay dividends during the financial crisis of 2008, which minimized the impact of the 
crisis on the financial sector (Mehdi, Sahut, & Teulon, 2016). Rose (2016) noted that 
board committees with more executive directors with technical expertise provide more 
oversight reducing the firm’s credit risk exposure. Outa and Waweru (2016) posited that 
compliance with corporate governance guidelines increased financial performance and 
the value of listed companies in Kenya. 
Abou-El-Sood (2017) cautioned that firms with strong corporate governance 
structures increase their exposures in risky assets during favorable market conditions with 
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the hope of reducing the exposures in a recession, a strategy that is challenging to 
implement. Banks with shareholder-friendly corporate governance frameworks 
implement risky capital management strategies to increase shareholder return (Anginer et 
al., 2016). Financial institutions with strong corporate governance frameworks and 
shareholder-friendly boards expose their entities to high systemic risk underscoring the 
need to ensure the alignment of the interests of all stakeholders of the firm (Iqbal, Strobl, 
& Vähämaa, 2015). Shinozaki, Moriyasu, and Uchida (2016) noted that firms with high 
ownership by stable and controlling shareholders prioritize owners’ interests at the 
expense of other stakeholders increasing agency risk. Sheedy and Griffin (2017) 
cautioned that emphasizing good corporate governance and effective risk management 
practices without an appropriate risk culture is ineffective and advised regulators to 
promote an industry-wide culture that encourages honesty, integrity, transparency, and 
prudence. 
Managerial risk-taking. In the pursuit of organizational goals, managers in 
banks must take risk decisions in an industry with various uncertainties, fierce 
competition, standard products, price-sensitive customers, and demanding shareholders 
(Eastburn, & Sharland, 2016; Hoskisson, Chirico, Zyung, & Gambeta, 2016). Guill 
(2016) posited that firms with effective risk management capabilities maintain a 
competitive edge over rivals by making the right decisions regarding risk acceptance, 
risk-adjusted returns, risk and reward, risk-pricing, and capital adequacy levels. Akande, 
Kwenda, and Ehalaiye (2018) argued that competition and rivalry in Sub-Saharan Africa 
encouraged managers of commercial banks to invest in risky ventures leading to high 
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default risk, financial distress, and closure of some banks. The incentive to achieve high 
earnings, the risk of losing one’s job, and the desire to outcompete other internal 
departments for organizational supremacy and recognition motivate managers to take 
excessive risks (Chang & Talley, 2017; McCormack & Deacon, 2017; Witman, 2018). 
Firms with advanced risk management systems outcompete rivals by providing 
appropriate pricing to low-risk borrowers and implementing active portfolio management 
strategies to optimize their regulatory or economic capital (Erdinç & Gurov, 2016). 
Hoskisson et al. (2016) argued that managers are rational in decision making, noting that 
if expected returns from two projects are similar, but returns from one project are 
uncertain, managers will select the project whose returns are predictable.  
Chang and Talley (2017) observed that the size and strength of the financial 
institution influence managerial risk-taking behavior noting that managers in large global 
banks have strong incentives to pursue riskier strategies to deliver higher returns to 
demanding investors, creditors, and shareholders. Managers of too-big-to-fail banks with 
a reasonable expectation of bailout in distress situations by regulators or governments sell 
high-risk products and services to unsuspecting clients exposing the firms and taxpayers 
to losses (Cziraki, 2017). Government guarantees lead to shareholder moral hazard by 
encouraging excessive risk-taking in financial institutions because, in anticipation of a 
bailout by the governments, firm owners transfer their risk-shifting incentives to the 
managers in pursuit of high shareholder returns (Eufinger & Gill, 2016). Acharya, 
Pagano, and Volpin (2016) cautioned that bank products such as mortgage-backed 
securities, credit default swaps, government guarantees, and life insurance earn interest 
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and premiums upfront in the short run but have potential long-run risks exposing the 
firms to losses in future. Mili and Abid (2016) underscored the influence of franchise 
value on managerial risk-taking by indicating that managers of firms with low franchise 
value pursue more risky strategies while those in firms with high franchise value assess 
risk options responsibly by considering the reputational impact of their decisions. 
Pan, Siegel, and Wang (2017) posited that a firm’s corporate risk culture shapes 
the effectiveness of its corporate governance and risk management practices and plays a 
key role in coordinating and regulating the choice of risk and control decisions. Similar 
compensation strategies may produce different managerial risk-taking behavior in two 
firms depending on the nature of the risk culture in each firm and the prevailing 
economic conditions (Rattaggi, 2017; Trendowski & Rustambekov, 2017). A poor ethical 
environment that emphasizes the maximization of monetary gain encourages adverse 
managerial risk-taking behavior leading to potential losses and regulatory sanction 
(Hoskisson et al., 2016; Rocchi & Thunder, 2017). Baker, Cohanier, and Leo (2017) 
argued that the top leadership at Société Générale ignored breaches in internal controls 
because risky trading practices were profitable, emphasizing the role of top management 
in instituting a culture of good ethical conduct, governance, and risk management 
practices. Leão, Leão, and Bhimjee (2017) posited that compensation strategies that 
linked managerial bonuses to current year earnings and not on the firms’ long-term 
performance and shareholder value encouraged managers to take excessive risks. 
Ssekiziyivu, Mwesigwa, Joseph, and Nkote Nabeta (2017) argued that ineffective risk 
management practices including lack of board oversight and poor monitoring determine 
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the nature of managerial risk-taking behavior in such firms. Effective risk management 
practices compel managers to set performance targets that focus on asset quality rather 
than volume growth (Nkundabanyanga, Akankunda, Nalukenge, & Tusiime, 2017). 
Haque and Shahid (2016) noted that poor risk management practices of government-
owned banks in India encouraged managers to focus on volume growth leading to high 
loan losses and low profitability. 
Petrou and Procopiou (2016) examined the relationship between CEO 
shareholdings and earnings manipulation and discovered that stock options regulate 
excessive managerial risk-taking and reduce earnings manipulation. Market practices 
suggesting that stable stock prices forecast high stock returns encourage managers of 
listed banks to smooth earnings to meet the expectations of investors (Yasser & Soliman, 
2018; Ozili, 2016). Eckbo, Thorburn, and Wang (2016) argued that CEO share ownership 
structures incentivize managers to stay with the firm for longer tenors and consequently 
make prudent long-term risk-reward decisions. CEOs approaching retirement are risk-
averse and will adopt hedging strategies to mitigate market risk to protect their firm-
specific wealth and legacy (Croci, Del Giudice, & Jankensgård, 2016). CEO 
entrenchment and longevity, on the other hand, provides a sense of job security and may 
encourage managers to adopt riskier preferences (Ferris, Javakhadze, & Rajkovic, 2017; 
Hoskisson et al., 2016). Bushman, Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2018) posited that CEO 
longevity and materialism might lead to overconfidence, complacency and encourage 
excessive risk-taking behavior. Overconfident CEOs underestimate the likelihood and 
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consequences of their risky decisions and overestimate the potential benefits from their 
decisions investing in high-risk exposures (Kubick & Lockhart, 2017). 
Pan et al. (2017) argued that firms might achieve positive managerial risk-taking 
behavior by ensuring that compensation contracts align risk-taking incentives at different 
levels in the firm and recruiting managers that match the firm’s risk culture. Firms need 
to design compensation structures that have fixed and variable incentives as well as 
implement governance frameworks that distinguish between management from 
ownership (Petrou & Procopiou, 2016). Firms need to control the level of bonuses that 
managers earn and ensure that rewards align with the entity’s long-term performance 
goals (Acharya et al., 2016; Leão et al., 2017). Compensation strategies may positively 
influence managerial risk-taking if they eliminate specific sales quotas and focus on 
customer satisfaction (O'Connell, Lee, & O'Sullivan, 2018; Witman, 2018). Wood and 
Lewis (2017) noted that strong corporate risk culture is the basis for a risk management 
framework that drives prudent risk management behavior. Managerial risk preferences 
evolve requiring the board, regulators, and auditors to monitor the changes in managers’ 
risk preferences from the time of joining the firm to when they get closer to retirement 
(Alzoubi, 2017; Croci et al., 2016). Eastburn and Sharland (2016) underscored the need 
for regulators and boards to resolve the risk/reward conflict to reduce losses as well as 
enhance earnings and shareholder value. 
Milkau (2017) emphasized the importance of trust, honesty, responsibility, 
transparency, and agility in shaping managerial risk-taking behavior and advised board 
committees to focus on the intrinsic sources of motivation for managers. Firms need to 
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implement effective risk management practices including strengthening the independence 
of risk and assurance functions and taking advantage of diversification to reduce the 
adverse impact of intense competition on managerial risk-taking behavior (Haque & 
Shahid, 2016; Muhammad, Khan, & Xu, 2018; Ssekiziyivu et al., 2017). Regulatory 
initiatives such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010; and effective corporate governance structures are important in moderating 
managerial risk-taking behavior (Alzoubi, 2017; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2016; 
Trendowski & Rustambekov, 2017). Herzog (2017) urged regulators to ensure that 
competition does not crowd out good ethical behavior and risk culture by emphasizing 
professionalism, accountability, and consequence management. McCormack and Deacon 
(2017) posited that managers need to establish trust-based relationships with all 
stakeholders in addition to good corporate governance and risk management systems to 
address agency problems. 
Compensation Practices 
In this subsection, I explore leading practices regarding compensation strategies 
that commercial banks implement in supporting effective risk management practices 
including principles underlying compensation strategies, compensation and firm 
performance, the unintended consequences of compensation, and strategies for managing 
compensation risk. 
Principles underlying compensation. Shan and Walter (2016) highlighted the 
two main categories of compensation strategies including fixed and variable 
compensation. Firms provide several monetary forms of compensation including basic 
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salary, bonus, stocks, deferred compensation, subsidized loans, as well as non-monetary 
benefits such as cars, yachts, or jets, club memberships, travel expenses, housing, medical 
insurance, and entertainment (Ting & Huang, 2018). Trends in the financial services 
sector in the United States indicate that stock and performance shares comprise the 
highest form of compensation at 34%, basic pay 18%, stock options 19%, while other 
forms of compensation comprise 29% of total compensation. Tóth (2016) urged firms to 
determine the appropriate level of fixed pay to attract the best talent in the industry and 
pay at least 40% of the variable compensation component in 3-5 years’ deferred period to 
encourage the appropriate managerial risk-taking behavior. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s guidelines on corporate 
governance outlined several principles underlying effective compensation systems 
emphasizing the need for banks to ensure that compensation structures motivate 
managers to achieve the firm’s long-term goals of the firm while adhering to the set risk 
appetite (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). The committee emphasized 
the need for the board of directors to oversee the effective implementation of the firm’s 
compensation strategies, review compensation policies annually, approve senior 
management compensation and ensure that incentives align with risk implications over a 
multi-year financial performance period. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
emphasized the need for firms to ensure that compensation strategies comprised both 
fixed and variable components. The committee urged firms’ compensation committees to 
adjust variable incentives appropriately in response to managerial risk-taking behavior. 
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Shan and Walter (2016) posited that while fixed compensation considers the 
availability and market value of managerial talent, variable compensation reflects the 
performance of the firm in a financial period by rewarding acceptable risk-taking 
behavior. Fichter (2016) noted that firms could use compensation strategies to strengthen 
ethical standards by providing incentives to employees who act with integrity 
consistently. Compensation strategies with an optimum combination of fixed and variable 
incentives align stakeholder objectives and resolve conflicts of interests between the 
various parties (Chen & Qiu, 2016; Tóth, 2016). In developing compensation structures, 
firms need to assess the interactions between different compensation components, to 
avoid the unintended consequence of encouraging excessive risk-taking behavior 
(Colonnello, Curatola, & Hoang, 2017). Abrokwah, Hanig, and Schaffer (2018) advised 
firms to adopt compensation strategies that are appropriate for the industry, arguing that 
bonus pay encourages excessive risk-taking in the financial services sector while driving 
prudent risk-taking behavior in the transportation, communication, and energy sectors. 
Page (2018) underscored the need to consider the managers’ attributes including 
employee risk-taking behavior in developing compensation strategies and noted that 
firms whose incentive plans integrate employee attributes encourage prudent risk-taking 
behavior and increases firm value. Compensation committees need to consider managers’ 
moral values and intrinsic goals when designing incentive schemes because incentive-
based compensation is not a key source of motivation in environmentally-friendly firms 
where managers value the pursuit of environmental goals (Francoeur et al., 2015). Firms 
need to implement compensation structures that defer bonus payments over several 
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financial years in the future, encouraging managers to increase the firm’s value in the 
long-term (Koch et al., 2017). Llanos and Bin Ahmad (2017) cautioned that merit-based 
compensation strategies might not increase the firm’s value and advocated for the 
adoption of such compensation strategies in situations of low uncertainty. 
Compensation and firm performance. Yahya and Ghazali (2017) investigated 
the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance and noted that 
compensation influenced both the operating and market performance of a firm positively. 
Firms whose performance is above the set performance objectives pay their managers 
more incentives in search of greater success and pay managers whose performance is 
below target less compensation (Boodoo, 2018). Compensation regulates managers’ 
relative power and influences managerial risk-taking decisions shaping the firm’s long-
term performance culture (Zagonov & Salganik-Shoshan, 2017). Brockman, Lee, and 
Salas (2016) posited that firms use equity-based compensation ahead of cash-based 
compensation strategies to encourage a decision-making culture that underscores the 
long-term interests of investors and shareholders. Smirnova and Zavertiaeva (2017) 
examined the impact of CEO compensation on firm performance and noted that while 
incentives motivate managers to achieve accounting-based results such incentives might 
not motivate managers to achieve market-based results. Raithatha and Komera (2016) 
concluded that compensation strategies do not motivate managers to achieve market-
based measures contrary to pay-for-performance expectations.  
Compensation strategies motivate managers in banks to achieve accounting-based 
performance indicators such as non-performing loans (NPL) and return on asset because 
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regulators focus on the accounting-based performance measures for supervisory purposes 
(Chou & Buchdadi, 2017). Saravanan, Srikanth, and Avabruth (2017) argued that the 
impact of compensation strategies on firm performance depends on the ownership 
structure of the entity, noting that managerial incentives positively impact the 
performance of non-family firms because such firms emphasize a pay-for-performance 
culture that is non-existent in family-owned firms. Jaiswall and Bhattacharyya (2016) 
indicated that while compensation encouraged firm performance and prudent risk-taking 
behavior in private sector firms, managerial incentives in public sector firms had no 
positive impact on firm risk and performance. Firms use compensation strategies to 
attract talented managers, motivate them to work hard, generate high returns in 
expectation of higher compensation and consequently increase shareholder value (Jung & 
Subramanian, 2017). Abrokwah et al. (2018) observed that when managers’ 
compensation depends on the firm’s long-term performance, managerial risk-taking 
aligns with the firm’s strategic objectives increasing firm and shareholder value. 
Aldatmaz, Ouimet, and Van Wesep (2017) underscored the importance of employee 
retention to firm performance and advocated for the implementation of broad-based 
employee stock options (BBSO) to reduce employee turnover, strengthen risk 
management and increase long-term firm performance. Adom (2018) argued that while 
commission-based compensation strategies might demotivate staff who fail to meet the 
aggressive set targets, the incentives improve employee work performance and retention. 
Bratten and Xue (2016) cautioned that equity incentives might not motivate 
managers to make decisions that enhanced the long-term value of the firm and 
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underscored the importance of institutional investors in monitoring compensation 
practices to ensure effective implementation. Francis, Hasan, Hunter, and Zhu (2017) 
argued that managerial compensation strategies that do not align the interests of 
shareholders and managers significantly increase the firms' exchange rate exposure 
impacting the entity’s financial performance and value. Firms that implement 
compensation strategies that rely on accounting performance indicators encourage 
managers to ignore projects with high long-term market returns in favor of projects that 
generate short-term accounting earnings (Kang & Nanda, 2017). Shareholders could 
mitigate the adverse impact of compensation strategies on firm performance by using 
equity-based compensation to negotiate low wage rates, reduce marginal cost, increase 
profits and improve the entity’s competitive advantage ahead of its rivals (Bova & Yang, 
2017). Cheng et al. (2015) noted the need for boards to implement strong pay-for-
performance incentives or provide managers with an ownership stake in the firm to 
incentivize managers to maximize firm value arguing that the gains from increasing 
managerial incentives offset the costs of excessive risk-taking behavior. Compensation 
contracts with penalties for poor performance and unethical behavior could discourage 
managers from engaging in earnings management practices and increase the firm’s ability 
to achieve its long-term performance goals (Koch et al., 2017). 
Hill, Lopez, and Reitenga (2016) underrated the role of compensation strategies 
on firm performance, arguing that some managers earn high incentives notwithstanding 
their abilities, effort, labor market standards, and the entity’s performance. Bugeja, 
Matolcsy, and Spiropoulos (2017) found no association between managerial incentives 
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and the firm’s return on assets contrary to the expectation that entities with optimal 
compensation structures record-high financial performance and shareholder value. Focke, 
Maug, and Niessen-Ruenzi (2017) discovered that executives of firms listed in Fortune ’s 
ranking of America’s top companies earned 8% lower compared to peers in other firms, 
trading off status and career benefits with additional financial remuneration. Bennett, 
Bettis, Gopalan, and Milbourn (2017) noted that firms whose managers fail to achieve 
their targets might experience an increase in employee turnover and cautioned against 
adopting performance-contingent incentives that focus on accounting targets because 
they provide employees perverse incentives to make short-term decisions contrary to 
shareholders’ interests. Wang and Seifert (2017) underestimated the influence of 
compensation on firm performance, noting that employees who faced wage reductions 
during the financial crisis of 2008 showed even higher levels of commitment to 
organizational goals because the workers participated in the decision-making process. 
Omoregie and Kelikume (2017) posited that executive compensation in the Nigerian 
banking sector did not significantly influence firm performance and implored 
shareholders and regulators to align compensation with performance to ensure that 
managers act in the best interest of all stakeholders. 
The unintended consequences of compensation. Kang and Kim (2016) 
cautioned firms against the unintended consequences of compensation structures, noting 
that while stock options and restricted stocks incentivize managers to make decisions in 
the interest of shareholders, debt-like compensation strategies such as pension or deferred 
compensation encourage managers to make decisions that prioritize debtholders’ goals. 
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Tian (2017) argued that while equity incentives mitigate agency risk, they might 
encourage managers to release confidential information, provide misleading information 
to the market, or abuse accounting principles to manipulate the stock price and influence 
the value of their equity holdings. Almadi and Lazic (2016) investigated the impact of 
incentive-based compensation on earnings management and noted that compensation 
could encourage the misreporting of accounting results to increase their remuneration. Jia 
(2017) explored the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives on managerial 
risk-taking and noted that compensation strategies might encourage financial misconduct 
in firms where executive turnover is high, top management executives are close to 
retirement, and poor performance might result in the replacement of the top leadership 
team. Firms with high levels of stock options in their compensation structures expose 
their incentive schemes to equity price risk, which encourages managers to breach 
internal control and risk management practices in pursuit of personal enrichment at the 
expense of the interests of other stakeholders (Liu & Liu, 2017).  
Casavecchia and Suh (2017) noted that while equity holdings improve the 
efficiency of resource allocation, increase firm value and shareholders’ wealth, such 
incentives need moderation as they compromise the interests of creditors and managers. 
Executives with maturing option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock 
prices to obtain lower strike prices or manipulate stock prices to increase option 
compensation by reporting negative abnormal returns before option grants and positive 
abnormal returns after the grant dates (Daines, McQueen, & Schonlau, 2018). Dittmann, 
Yu, and Zhang (2017) cautioned that risk-averse executives reduce the firm’s risk, even if 
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doing so destroys its value and encouraged firms to implement compensation strategies 
that encourage prudent risk-taking behavior as well as reward managerial effort. 
Abrokwah et al. (2018) posited that despite the alignment between stakeholders’ 
interests, managers could have strong incentives to undertake high-risk investments due 
to the aggressive pay-for-performance culture in the banking sector that underscores 
short-term performance and strong consequences for underperforming managers.  
Shah, Akbar, Liu, Liu, and Cao (2017) examined the role of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program in the United States of America in reducing risk-taking by restricting 
executive pay and discovered that the bail-out program guaranteed managers’ job 
security, a moral hazard problem that encouraged excessive risk-taking. Calomiris and 
Carlson (2016) posited that compensation strategies in systemically-important banks 
encourage managers to increase their wealth in the form of excessive incentive packages 
and benefits, subsidized loans, by manipulating internal controls and withholding 
valuable information from the stakeholders on the performance of the entity. Schoen 
(2016) noted that before the financial crisis of 2008, compensation structures in banks 
rewarded executives for positive returns without penalties for unethical behavior, a matter 
made worse by the conflict of interest inherent in the compensation arrangements 
between banks and rating firms. Baginski, Campbell, Hinson, and Koo, (2017) argued 
that while compensation strategies may motivate managers to withhold bad news, 
incentive plans that offer large payments to executives in the event of dismissal 
encourage the timely disclosure of adverse information for appropriate action.  
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Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa (2016) posited that while several pay contracts 
reduce unethical managerial behavior in line with efficient contracting principles, the 
contracts might motivate managers to invest in high-risk projects with large short-term 
returns to increase their remuneration on termination. Managers with significant inside 
debt manage firms conservatively and avoid excessive risk in pursuit of high pension and 
deferred compensation in the future, which stifles innovation, growth, and firm value 
(Chen & Qiu, 2016; Yang & Hou, 2016). Chen (2017) explored the impact of managerial 
risk-taking incentives on research and development (R&D) investments and noted that 
compensation strategies might constrain innovation and investment in research because 
managers prefer investment activities that yield returns in the short-term to prospective 
research projects. Driver and Guedes (2017) examined the impact of incentives on 
research and development expenditure and noted that strong forms of pay-for-
performance incentives could increase the agency problem by motivating managers to 
limit R&D spending in pursuit of short-term personal wealth. 
Bakke, Mahmudi, Fernando, and Salas (2016) investigated the impact of option 
compensation contracts on the hedging behavior of managers and discovered that when 
executives have a large portion of their wealth that depends on the future performance of 
the firm they are risk-averse and increase their hedging intensity which increases the 
firm’s operating costs and reduces profits. Van Bekkum (2016) cautioned that managers 
with inside debt holdings adopt conservative balance sheet management approaches, 
while equity-based incentives encourage the shifting of earnings risk to debtholders, 
increasing the misalignment of interests between debt holders and equity holders. Berger, 
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Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2016) analyzed compensation structures after the financial 
crisis of 2008 and discovered that high equity incentives encouraged lower-level 
managers to take excessive risks because junior managers were anonymous and in a 
better position to find comparable employment following the entity’s failure. 
In a study of the relationship between inside debt incentives and corporate tax 
sheltering Chi, Huang, and Sanchez (2017) noted that when firms face high default risk, 
managers adopt a risk-averse tax compliance approach to protect their future pension 
benefits and deferred compensation reward at the expense of increasing the entity’s tax 
burden. Incentive schemes encourage managers with a greater career ambition to take 
higher strategic risks and maximize returns in a favorable business environment and fall 
short in encouraging business leaders to exploit the available opportunities and increase 
the firm’s value during financial distress (Chng & Wang, 2016). Lin, Officer, and Shen 
(2018) studied the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition 
decisions and discovered that executives with higher inside debt incentives are more 
likely to engage in mergers that generate lower announcement returns for shareholders to 
protect their future wealth. Anderson and Core (2017) cautioned that when risk-taking 
incentives are high relative to managers’ wealth, such executives take more risk to 
increase their wealth and urged firms to implement risk-reducing incentives such as 
future cash pay, pension benefits, deferred compensation, and severance pay strategies. 
Boodoo (2018) posited that executives in banks were taking excessive risk to 
extract higher compensation as a reward for the high scrutiny by the regulators and the 
high risk of losing their jobs. Cen and Doukas (2017) explored the impact of deferred 
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compensation on executives’ risk preferences and noted that managers who hold a 
significant portion of volatile deferred compensation portfolios pursue risky financial and 
investment policies in pursuit of individual wealth ahead of the interests of other 
stakeholders of the firm. Glover and Levine (2017) examined the effects of stock, option, 
and fixed compensation on a managerial investment choice and noted that incentives 
encouraged the average executive to overinvest by 1.3 percentage points per year in 
pursuit of higher accounting profits to enhance their remuneration. O'Connell, Lee, and 
O'Sullivan (2018) studied the relationship between managerial equity incentives and 
licensing and concluded that stock ownership encourages managers to favor prudent risk-
taking because such incentives align the managers’ goals with the long-term interests of 
the shareholders.  
Gande and Kalpathy (2017) explored the relationship between equity incentives 
and managerial risk-taking before the financial crisis of 2008 and cautioned that 
regulation mandating explicit restrictions on the level of managerial compensation could 
constrain innovation and limit firm performance. Hirsch, Reichert, and Sohn (2017) 
underscored the role of clawback provisions in reducing excessive managerial risk-taking 
behavior and the impact of risky investments on the firm’s performance and cautioned 
firms against the potential unintended effects of clawbacks including a risk-averse culture 
that inhibits growth and innovation. Firms that adopt performance-based clawbacks can 
impose additional risk on managers if they are not in perfect control of the clawback 
trigger resulting in the decrease in the executives’ performance-based pay, which might 
reduce their motivation (Kroos, Schabus, & Verbeeten, 2017). Sisli-Ciamarra and 
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Savaser (2016) studied the impact of managerial incentives on firm risk and cautioned 
that pay-for-performance incentives could induce more risk-taking, arguing that risky 
projects create more value and increase the expected value of incentive compensation. 
Strategies for managing compensation risk. Berger et al. (2016) observed that 
after the financial crisis of 2008, regulators and policymakers sought to address 
shortcomings of banks' compensation structures by introducing clawback clauses for 
bonus payments, aligning incentives with performance and risk, and establishing 
guidelines for deferred compensation. Sanchez-Marin, Lozano-Reina, Baixauli-Soler, and 
Lucas-Perez (2017) underscored the role of say on pay (SOP) governance mechanisms in 
mandating shareholders to assess the suitability of executives’ compensation and ensure 
the alignment of executive compensation in firms with good corporate governance 
practices. Boodoo (2018) underestimated the importance of corporate governance in 
managing compensation risk and argued that executives take higher risks to obtain higher 
incentives in compensation for the extra scrutiny and rigorous reporting requirements 
under formal governance regimes. Calomiris and Carlson (2016) emphasized the role of 
manager-owned governance structures in reducing compensation risk by arguing that 
while managerial ownership could lead to higher owner benefits, such structures 
encourage prudent risk-taking because manager-stockholders are risk-averse. In 
designing compensation strategies, the board of directors needs to consider the firm’s 
long-term relationship with its creditors by managing information asymmetry to reduce 
financing costs (Chen & Qiu, 2016). Nguyen et al. (2017) advised regulators to 
implement risk-based supervisory measures and sanctions that prevent executives from 
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exploiting deficiencies in risk management practices to increase short-term bank 
performance in pursuit of higher compensation.  
Financial regulators require shareholders and boards to manage compensation risk 
by ensuring that remuneration committees have independent, competent and qualified 
members with specific roles and responsibilities (Kang & Nanda, 2017). The 
compensation committee of the board needs to ensure that compensation levels are 
consistent with the bank’s ethical values, objectives, strategy, business environment, and 
approve executive compensation (Financial institutions corporate governance regulations, 
2005). Kang and Kim (2016) noted that executive compensation risk is lower if an 
affiliated banker director is on the remuneration committee of the board due to a good 
appreciation of the pay-for-performance principles. Kang and Nanda (2017) advised 
remuneration committees to oversee the full disclosure of the components of executive 
remuneration in annual reports and called on regulators to educate shareholders, 
investors, creditors on their rights regarding managerial remuneration. Full disclosure of 
executive compensation in public company filings enables investors, creditors, regulators, 
and policymakers to determine whether the firm’s compensation philosophy and 
incentives align with the long-term performance objectives of the entity (Bettis, Bizjak, 
Coles, & Kalpathy, 2018). Ting and Huang (2018) urged regulators to oversee the full 
disclosure of non-monetary executive compensation, noting that banks could exploit 
weaknesses in internal policies to offer high benefits to managers that are not in line with 
the firm’s level of performance. 
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Chen, De Cesari, Hill, and Ozkan (2017) advised boards to ensure the alignment 
of the interests of shareholders, managers, and debt holders in designing compensation 
structures to mitigate the unintended consequences of compensation, including high 
agency costs. Compensation committees need to maintain a balance between risk-taking 
and risk-reducing incentives by monitoring and revising the firm’s risk-taking incentives 
with changes in the business and risk environment (Eufinger & Gill, 2016). Cheng et al. 
(2015) posited that regulators and policymakers could reduce the gap between the 
interests of managers and shareholders by increasing shareholder rights and 
implementing clawback practices that align executive compensation to the long-term 
performance objectives of the firm. The board of directors could minimize pay-for-
performance distortions by defining sales or profit targets relative to other firms as well 
as avoiding absolute compensation contracts (Bennett et al., 2017). Firms need to 
measure performance relative to an appropriate set of peers by focusing on the firm’s 
actual and expected performance relative to the performance of benchmark peers (Shan & 
Walter, 2016). Li and Wang (2016) advised shareholders to adopt multiyear accounting-
based performance (MAP) incentive plans to improve incentive alignment and mitigate 
excessive managerial pay because MAP plans are less volatile and align with the strategic 
objectives of the firm. Tian (2017) argued that firms could reduce equity compensation 
risk by ensuring that payoffs of equity grants depend on multiple long-term stock prices, 
aligning payoffs of restricted stock grants to the average stock price, and buying 
executives’ shares instead of managers selling their shares in the stock market. Boards 
could restrict the selling of stock by executives to the month the managers receive the 
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awards and monitor disclosures before and after scheduled grant dates to reduce the 
perverse incentives that encourage adverse risk behavior (Daines et al., 2018). 
White and Hollingsworth (2018) posited that while salaries and bonus incentives 
could increase Tier 1 capital ratios, equity and pension compensation might encourage 
greater risk-taking. Erkens, Gan, and Yurtoglu (2018) argued that regardless of the type 
of compensation, firms that adopt clawbacks reduce compensation risk, improve financial 
reporting quality, and record low executive turnover if remuneration committees ensure 
that clawbacks do not penalize managers for non-controllable risks. Clawbacks regulate 
managerial behavior because they expose bank executives to future potential losses of 
pay due to unethical behavior, misconduct, poor managerial oversight and excessive risk-
taking (Kroos et al., 2017). Compensation strategies with strong clawback provisions 
disincentivize managers from investing in high-risk projects because investments that fail 
adversely impact executives’ incentives in the future (Glover & Levine, 2017). Hirsch et 
al. (2017) advised remuneration committees to implement clawback provisions together 
with other measures including effective risk management processes that encourage 
managers to make prudent risk management decisions that increase the firm’s long-term 
value. Boards could reduce executives’ incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking 
behavior by designing option grants as a series of small at-the-money periodic grants or 
spread the awards so that executives receive payments at different times in the future 
(Daines et al., 2018). Holden and Kim (2017) advised regulators to reduce compensation 
risk by reviewing the accounting treatment for performance share plans to ensure that 
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grant date fair valuations provide shareholders with an accurate assessment of the cost of 
the plans. 
Transition  
Section 1 content provided the foundation for the study. The section included the 
background to the problem and described the problem as the lack of compensation 
strategies that support effective risk management practices. The purpose of the study was 
to explore compensation strategies that some bank executives in Uganda use to support 
effective risk management practices. The nature of the study provides information on the 
appropriateness of the qualitative research method and the multiple case study design in 
exploring the phenomenon. I provide information regarding the research and interview 
questions, the conceptual framework, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations in 
describing the approach to achieving the purpose of the study. 
The significance of the study provides information on how the study’s findings 
might assist commercial banks, regulators, policymakers in adopting effective 
compensation strategies. A review of professional and academic literature focuses on the 
theory of the firm as the conceptual framework which along, with alternative theories, 
provides an in-depth understanding of how compensation influences managerial risk-
taking behavior. The review of extant literature facilitates a detailed discussion of 
compensation strategies and risk management practices in the financial services sector. 
The key themes in the literature review include ERM frameworks, regulatory guidelines, 
corporate governance, managerial risk-taking, principles underlying compensation, 
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compensation and firm performance, the unintended consequences of compensation, and 
strategies for managing compensation risk. 
In section 2, I provide an overview introducing the section, discuss the project 
including the role of the researcher in the data collection process and the participants. I 
discuss the research method and design along with the population, sampling, ethical 
research considerations, data collection instruments, data collection technique, data 
organization technique, and data analysis. I discuss the approach to confirming the 
reliability and validity of the study’s findings and conclude with a transition and 
summary statement. In this section, I provide an introductory overview of Section 3. 
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Section 2: The Project 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore compensation 
strategies that some executives in Uganda use to support effective risk management 
practices. The targeted population comprised chief risk officers of five global commercial 
banks in Uganda with success in implementing compensation strategies that support risk 
management practices. The findings from this study might contribute to building 
awareness about compensation strategies that support effective risk management 
practices in the banking sector in Uganda. Findings from this study might also have 
positive social benefits including (a) protection of depositors’ funds, (b) improving 
financial inclusion by extending affordable financial services to businesses and 
individuals, (c) inculcating a good savings and investment culture, and (d) improving the 
welfare of the communities that the banks serve. 
Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher in the data collection process is to elicit comprehensive 
information regarding participants’ past experiences of a study phenomenon (Henderson, 
2017). The goal is to gain individual insights and perspectives on the topic through in-
depth inquiry with the assistance of an appropriate research method and design (Dikko, 
2016). Researchers can support participants’ insights with other sources of information 
(Thirsk & Clark, 2017). Qualitative research enables researchers to conduct an in-depth 
inquiry by collecting data from multiple types and sources to establish emerging themes 
that address the research problem (Van den Berg & Struwig, 2017; Yin, 2018). As the 
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researcher in this study, I sought to gain insights from the experiences of participants 
with success in implementing compensation strategies that encourage prudent risk-taking 
behavior. I collected information from risk management executives who met the specified 
criteria by administering semistructured interviews with open-ended questions (see 
Appendix A). Researchers use open-ended interview questions to explore participants’ 
experiences (Van den Berg & Struwig, 2017). Following approval from the Walden 
University Institutional Review Board (IRB), I collected data by scheduling interviews 
with volunteer participants.  
Another role of the researcher is to maintain a professional and transparent 
relationship with research participants by seeking their informed consent, protecting their 
confidentiality and privacy, and respecting the views of vulnerable participants including 
requests to omit any sensitive information in the final report (Bracken-Roche, Bell, 
Macdonald, & Racine, 2017). It is important for researchers to let interviewees know they 
do not have to respond to questions they are uncomfortable with or elaborate on sensitive 
topics, and they can stop the interview process where appropriate (Bengtsson & Fynbo, 
2018). I maintained a professional relationship with the participants and protected their 
privacy and trust with the guidance of an interview protocol (see Appendix B). 
My role as a researcher was also to maintain objectivity, monitor verbal and 
nonverbal behavior, and remain alert to my biases and how they might impact the data 
collection process. After collecting the relevant data, I interpreted and analyzed 
unstructured data by sorting, filtering, building relationships among the data, categorizing 
the data, defining emerging themes, analyzing results, and reporting the findings. NVivo 
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software helps qualitative researchers store, manage, query, and analyze unstructured 
data in various formats including text, images, audio, and video (Phillips & Lu, 2018). 
However, researchers have suggested supplementing NVivo with traditional coding tools, 
including colored pens and sticky notes (Maher, Hadfield, Hutchings, & de Eyto, 2018). 
Thus, I used the NVivo 12 software program for data analysis and augmented the 
application with traditional coding tools where appropriate. 
Another key role of the researcher is to observe the ethical norms, values, and 
principles that govern research including respect for the participants, transparency, 
honesty and ensuring the confidentiality and security of all respondents’ information 
(Halkovic, 2018). When the study involves humans, it is important for researchers to 
uphold ethical research values including informed consent of the participants, minimum 
harm and maximum benefit, inclusiveness, justice, and protecting the interests of 
vulnerable respondents (Petillion, Melrose, Moore, & Nuttgens, 2016). However, 
maintaining ethical conduct is a challenge for the practitioner-researcher because of 
individual bias, time, and financial resource constraints (Das & Sil, 2017). Ethical 
committees support researchers by ensuring that research proposals comply with the 
ethical conduct guidelines for research with a focus on minimizing harm to the 
participants (Wilson, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2017). As a practitioner-researcher, I 
maintained ethical conduct with the guidance of the ethical committee and conducted the 
study in commercial banks where I am not employed to ensure independence. 
Researchers must also comply with the ethical principles and guidelines in The 
Belmont Report issued by the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
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Subjects and Biomedical and Behavioral Research on September 30, 1978 (Adashi, 
Walters, & Menikoff, 2018). The commission recommended three ethical principles of 
the human subject including respect for persons, beneficence, and justice (Miracle, 2016). 
Following these principles includes informed consent, trust, equal opportunity to benefit 
from the research, selection of participants, privacy, the confidentiality of the 
information, and the assessment of risks and benefits of the research findings to 
participants (Williams & Anderson, 2018). However, the thin line between research and 
practice and the increasing complexity in research topics suggest the need to review these 
guidelines (Friesen, Kearns, Redman, & Caplan, 2017). For this study, I complied with 
the three ethical principles as well as the underlying guidelines in the report. 
The role of the researcher is also to ensure that respondents shape the findings of 
the study and not the researcher’s bias, motivation, or interest from their past experiences, 
expertise, or knowledge of the research area (Amankwaa, 2016). Bias is any influence 
that might distort the results of the study, which is difficult to manage when researchers 
are an integral part of the research process (Galdas, 2017). Although a researcher might 
have prior knowledge and expertise about the study topic and research area, it is 
important to manage assumptions that might influence the analysis by maintaining 
reflexivity through memo writing and keeping a journal (Fleet, Burton, Reeves, & 
DasGupta, 2016). Researchers can employ cognitive interviewing to identify and manage 
three types of bias in qualitative research including construct bias, method bias, and item 
bias (Benítez, Padilla, van de Vijver, & Cuevas, 2018). Researchers use other techniques 
to mitigate bias including, triangulation, ensuring data saturation, member checking, 
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sense-making, and interview protocols, which help facilitate honest responses and the 
transparent interpretation, analysis, and presentation of the findings (Toews et al., 2016). 
Finally, the researcher is responsible for documenting the study’s trustworthiness 
to ensure credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of the study’s 
findings (Amankwaa, 2016). Triangulation involves the validation of data from two or 
more sources to enhance the credibility and trustworthiness of the study’s findings 
(Varpio, Ajjawi, Monrouxe, O’brien, & Rees, 2017). Member checking involves the 
sharing of the findings with the participants for validation to enhance the accuracy, 
credibility, validity, and transferability of the study’s findings (Amankwaa, 2016). 
Sensemaking requires researchers to use their experiences and the literature to detect 
emerging themes, trends, insights, and contradictions (Varpio et al., 2017). An interview 
protocol provides guidance to researchers on what to say before and after the interview, 
asking questions that align with the research purpose, how to ask them, and in what order 
(Chung, Hong, Kim, Yang, & Yoon, 2017; Taylor, Fornusek, Ruys, Bijak, & Bauman, 
2017). An interview protocol refinement framework helps ensure that interview questions 
align with research questions, facilitates an inquiry-based conversation, encourages 
feedback, and provides for the piloting of the interview protocol (Castillo-Montoya, 
2016). For this study, I employed triangulation, member checking, data saturation, and 
interview protocols including cognitive interviewing, to detect and mitigate researcher 





The participants that I interviewed for the study included chief risk officers who 
have implemented compensation strategies that support effective risk management 
practices in Uganda. Researchers must define the eligibility criteria of the study’s 
participants to satisfy the requirements of the research question as well as confirm their 
availability and willingness to participate in the research process (Marks, Wilkes, Blythe, 
& Griffiths, 2017). Defining the appropriate eligibility criteria for the research 
participants facilitates effective respondent selection, ensures the generation of relevant 
data, and increases the trustworthiness of the study’s findings (Sil & Das, 2017; Valerio 
et al., 2016). The eligibility criteria for this study’s participants included being a risk 
management executive of any age or gender with leadership responsibility for the 
effective implementation of risk management practices in their organizations. Participants 
must have had proven experience in successfully implementing compensation strategies 
that support effective risk management practices. 
Following the definition of the eligibility criteria, I accessed the study participants 
through letters and e-mail to seek their cooperation by emphasizing the professional and 
personal benefits of their participation. Researchers can encourage participants to 
participate in the study by emphasizing the purpose of the research and how the results 
might benefit the respondents, their organizations, and the society in compensation for 
their time and contribution (Khatamian Far, 2018). Emphasizing the personal, 
professional, or altruistic benefits of the participants’ involvement motivates them to 
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remain active during the research process (Raymond, Profetto-McGrath, Myrick, & 
Strean, 2018).  
I approached potential participants through a letter to CEOs of participating 
institutions outlining the purpose of the study and the potential benefits to the institutions 
and the financial services sector. Researchers can complement the costly traditional 
methods of accessing research participants such as newspapers, letters, recruitment flyers, 
and in-person engagements with secure social media platforms (Carter-Harris, 2016). 
Following the CEO's approval of their risk management executives to participate in the 
study, I engaged the participants by e-mail to encourage them to participate in the study 
by emphasizing the potential personal and professional benefits of the findings from the 
study. 
After gaining access to the participants, I established a mutual working 
relationship with the respondents to gain their confidence and trust as well as confirm 
their availability, their preferred mode of communication, and a suitable time to conduct 
the interviews in line with the interview protocol. Strong relationships with participants 
can address potential tensions that might arise during the research process that impact the 
engagement of participants and the validity of the study’s findings (Pinnegar & Quiles- 
Fernández, 2018). Building a professional relationship with an interviewee helps 
researchers to encourage respondents to actively participate in the research to enable 
researchers to elicit valuable and meaningful data (Newton, 2016). Additionally, mutual 
relationships with research participants based on honesty, transparency, confidentiality, 
respect and trust enhance qualitative data collection (Olsen, Lehto, & Chan, 2016). I 
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established working relationships with the research participants through trust, respect, 
transparency, avoiding conflict of interest, and emphasizing the voluntary nature of the 
engagement and the ability of interviewees to withdraw their participation at will. 
In defining the eligibility criteria for selecting the study participants, I ensured 
that the participants’ characteristics aligned with the overarching research question. 
Researchers need to select research participants with the level of knowledge, experience, 
skill, and competence to provide feedback that addresses the study’s research question 
(Boxall, Hemsley, & White, 2016; Valero et al., 2016). Researchers can ensure that 
participants’ characteristics align with the research question by identifying mutual 
interest that can motivate participants to enroll in the study (Parikh, Mason, & Williams, 
2016). I selected risk management executives who are accountable for implementing 
sound risk management practices in compensation to mitigate the adverse consequences 
of managerial incentives. 
Research Method and Design  
The three research methods that researchers use include qualitative, quantitative, 
and mixed methods (Yin, 2018). I used the qualitative research method to explore 
compensation strategies that executives in commercial banks use to support effective risk 
management practices. I applied a multiple case study design to explore the diverse 
compensation strategies that executives implement.  
Research Method 
Researchers use a qualitative research method to gain an in-depth understanding 
of a study phenomenon by exploring individual experiences, ideas, and concepts of the 
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participants (Van den Berg & Struwig, 2017). Qualitative researchers focus on the 
holistic view of the topic by collecting data within natural conditions through interviews, 
documents, case studies, observation, and interpretation (Neal Kimball & Turner, 2018). 
Qualitative research is ideal for researchers conducting explorative or investigative 
research where the findings of the study are not conclusive and serve as the basis for 
initial understanding and further research (Farooq, 2017). In contrast, researchers use 
quantitative research to determine the nature and extent of the relationship between the 
variables and causality (Park & Park 2016). Quantitative research involves the use of 
variables expressed in numbers and generates findings that are conclusive, descriptive, 
and generalizable to the population (Hoolachan, 2015; Onen, 2016). Researchers who use 
mixed-methods combine elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches 
(Venkatesh et al., 2016).  
I employed the qualitative research method because my goal was to gain an in-
depth understanding of the compensation strategies that executives in commercial banks 
use to support effective risk management practices. I did not use the quantitative method 
of inquiry because I did not seek to establish relationships between variables or causality. 
The mixed-methods approach was also not appropriate for the study because I did not 
intend to test hypotheses (Van den Berg & Struwig, 2017).  
Research Design 
The research design for this study was a multiple case study design, which 
enabled me to conduct an in-depth inquiry into compensation strategies that executives of 
multiple commercial banks use to encourage prudent risk-taking behavior. Researchers 
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use case studies to gain an in-depth understanding of a topic within its real-life setting 
based on individual experiences, knowledge, and expertise on the topic using open-ended 
questions (Yin, 2018). Multiple case study designs demonstrate internal validity and 
replication of the study’s findings across multiple firms through multiple sources of data 
from different entities within the same industry or sector (Larrinaga, 2016).  
I rejected the phenomenological and ethnography research designs in favor of the 
case study design because the multiple case study design allowed for the exploration of 
the participants’ diverse compensation strategies. The phenomenological design was not 
ideal for the study because I did not intend to explore how participants experience 
compensation strategies. Additionally, ethnographic designs are used to explore the 
culture or social world of a people or ethnic group by observing the group’s everyday 
behaviors (Hoolachan, 2015), which did not align with the study’s goal of exploring 
compensation strategies that encourage better risk management decisions.  
Data saturation in qualitative studies is a point at which any additional data a 
researcher collects ceases to provide new insights that significantly impact the study’s 
findings (Benítez et al., 2018). Researchers reach data saturation when they gather data 
from participants to the extent that no new themes or information emerges to help further 
understand the topic under study (Parikh et al., 2016; Thirsk & Clark, 2017). I ensured 
data saturation by using multiple sources of data including interviews, a review of 
company documentation, and observation. Triangulation is also a strategy that 
researchers use to achieve data saturation by using multiple sources and types of data to 
enhance the rigor, breadth, and depth of a study’s findings (Varpio et al., 2017). I 
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achieved data saturation by interviewing five risk management executives in different 
commercial banks and after that, used triangulation to obtain additional information from 
company documents, including compensation and risk management policies, to increase 
the validity and credibility of the study’s findings as well as reduce researcher bias.  
Population and Sampling 
In this multiple case study research, I considered a population of risk management 
executives from five commercial banks who had successfully implemented compensation 
strategies that support effective risk management practices. The sample size of the study 
was five participants, one from each bank. Griffith, Morris, and Thakar (2016) posited 
that when researchers identify the right population, they receive information that satisfies 
the research question within a reasonable period. Researchers must identify the study 
population transparently by acknowledging and managing bias as well as complying with 
ethical research requirements (Avon, 2017).  
Researchers need to select the right sample size within the population by targeting 
participants with the appropriate experience, knowledge of the research topic, and 
insights that satisfy the research question and purpose of the study within the available 
resource budget (Sheehan et al., 2016). Kirchherr and Charles (2018) advised researchers 
to select the right sample systematically by defining a list of the members of the 
population and selecting an appropriate sample from the sampling frame that meets the 
participant selection criteria. The criteria for potential participants included risk 
management executives of commercial banks with leadership responsibility for the 
effective implementation of risk management programs in their institutions. The 
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participants must have had experience in successfully implementing compensation 
strategies in the financial services sector that encourage prudent managerial risk-taking 
behavior. Researchers adopting qualitative research methodology and case study designs 
might use purposive and snowballing sampling techniques to identify and select 
participants with in-depth knowledge and experience on the research topic (Reniko, 
Mogomotsi, & Mogomotsi, 2018). 
Given that snowball sampling is ideal when researchers cannot construct a 
sampling frame, I adopted purposive sampling. Purposive sampling enables researchers 
using qualitative research methods to select participants with comparable characteristics 
including knowledge, and experience to ensure the collection of consistent, coherent, 
thematic information (Kirchherr & Charles, 2018). Using the purposive sampling 
technique, researchers select a small number of core participants, which facilitates data 
saturation by supporting the collection of rich data and the emergence of consistent 
themes (Parikh et al., 2016; Thirsk & Clark, 2017). Mobily and Morris (2018) cautioned 
that the small sample size and the intentional approach in purposive sampling techniques 
imply that the researchers cannot generalize the study’s findings to the broader 
population. I sought permission from the leadership of the participating organizations for 
their institution to participate in the study by emphasizing the purpose and scope of the 
study as well as the potential benefits to the entity or the industry. Following the receipt 
of the necessary approvals, I formally invited the eligible participants to confirm their 
interest in participating in the study voluntarily. Following the confirmation of the 
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participants’ interest, I obtained signed consent forms from the participants and agreed on 
the appropriate date, time, and venue for the interviews.  
Ethical Research 
Researchers must obtain approval from the appointed ethics committee before 
collecting data from human participants and follow other ethical protocols and guidelines 
in research including the securing of informed consent from potential research 
participants (Ayre, Wallis, & Daniell, 2018). The process of seeking voluntary informed 
consent requires researchers to fully disclose to prospective participants in the study the 
potential risks and benefits arising from their participation, the nature of their 
involvement and allowing them to decide without undue influence or incentive whether 
to participate in the research process (Sil & Das, 2017). Dhumale and Goudar (2017) 
advised researchers to ensure that the process of seeking informed consent satisfies 
minimum ethical criteria including the full disclosure of relevant information to the 
participants, ascertaining the decision-making ability of the participants, emphasizing the 
voluntary nature of the participation, and ensuring that the participants sign the consent 
form willingly. Brear (2018) argued that the purpose of seeking informed consent is to 
protect the human rights of vulnerable participants including the right to respect, 
knowledge of the relevant information, confidentiality, privacy, and cautioned against 
implementing informed consent as a one-off form-signing activity to satisfy the approval 
requirements of ethics committees. 
In line with the requirement that researchers must first obtain IRB approval before 
conducting research involving human participants (Yin, 2018). I obtained approval from 
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Walden University to collect data with IRB approval number 05-13-19-0654069. 
Following receipt of the IRB approval, I sent a formal invitation to senior management at 
the selected participating commercial banks for institutional approval for their institutions 
and risk management executives to participate in the study. Upon receipt of institutional 
approval, I invited the participants to participate in the study by sharing with them by e-
mail copies of the letter of invitation and informed consent form to enable them to make 
an informed decision on whether to participate in the study or not. Zhang (2017) advised 
researchers to create an environment of trust between the researcher and the participants 
by encouraging participants to participate in the research process voluntarily and to 
willingly withdraw at any stage of the process without any restrictions.  
I ensured that the selected risk management executives participate in the study 
voluntarily with the option of withdrawing from the research process at their will without 
any undue influence or restrictions (Makhoul, Chehab, Shaito, & Sibai, 2018). I indicated 
on the informed consent form that participation is voluntary and underscored the rights of 
the participants including the withdrawal from the research process at will without 
consequences (Neupane & Sinha, 2018). I included in the invitation letter details on how 
participants can withdraw from the research process as well as my contact details for any 
further information or clarification. I also included contact details of the Research 
Participant Advocate at Walden University in the consent form for participants who 
might want to discuss any issues relating to the research process privately. 
Khatamian Far (2018) posited that while researchers might use financial and non-
financial incentives to encourage participants to cooperate during the research process 
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and in appreciation of their time and effort, the level of such incentives must not unduly 
influence or impair participants’ objectivity. Parikh et al. (2016) underestimated the role 
of monetary incentives in encouraging participants to enroll and meaningfully contribute 
to the study and argued that personal and professional benefits of the study’s findings 
motivate participants to participate in the study effectively. I did not offer monetary 
incentives to the participants in this study because such incentives will not appeal to 
participants at the executive level. I appealed to the leadership of the commercial banks 
through the central bank to participate in the study by emphasizing the individual, 
professional, institutional and industry benefits of the study’s findings. Following the 
completion of the member checking process, I sent formal letters of appreciation to the 
participants acknowledging their valuable contribution and share a copy of the final study 
following its approval with them for their future reference. 
Ethical practices in research require researchers to seek free and informed 
consent, respect the privacy and confidentiality of participants, take steps to control 
unauthorized data access, and mitigate information security threats to participants’ 
privileged information (Petillion et al., 2016). Maintaining confidentiality and protecting 
the privacy of the participants’ identity are key ethical requirements in case-study 
research and researchers must implement initiatives to disguise the participants’ identity 
to protect their privacy and any adverse individual and professional consequences that 
might arise from their participation in the study (Fleet et al., 2016).  
Researchers must collect data after obtaining the consent and clearance of the 
participants, safely store the data for an extended period and seek continued informed 
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consent from participants before disclosure of any information (Yin, 2018). In addition to 
seeking informed consent, I ensured the confidentiality and privacy of participants by 
using codes rather than names to disguise the identity of the participants. I protected the 
participants’ data by storing the data under lock and key, data encryption, and ensure 
authorized access by password. I will maintain all the data, records, and information for 5 
years and seek participants’ consent before disclosing any privileged information.  
Daku (2018) posited that while ethics rules and regulations guide in the 
implementation of ethical behavior in research, there is a need for virtuous researchers to 
do what is morally right, beyond complying with the minimum requirements of the ethics 
board. In the absence of universal laws or rules that govern or define ethical practice, 
virtue ethics requires researchers to develop reflexivity and responsiveness in addressing 
potential ethical challenges consistently (Dzidic & Bishop, 2017). Rodríguez-Dorans 
(2018) argued that reflexivity helps researchers to comply with research ethics rules by 
developing an intuition-informed decision-making process necessary in conducting 
interviews with sensitivity. I went beyond the set ethical rules and regulations to ensure 
self-awareness and discernment to do what is morally right during the research process. 
Data Collection Instruments 
In this multiple case study, I was the primary data collection instrument by 
conducting semistructured interviews using open-ended questions (see Appendix A). 
Researchers use interviews to gain insights into a phenomenon of interest from the 
interviewees by collecting data regarding the participants’ experiences, knowledge, 
emotions, beliefs on the study topic in its natural conditions (Whitehead & Baldry, 2017). 
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Researchers use semistructured interviews to gain insights from the interviewee on a 
study topic by administering a set of open-ended questions that allow the generation of 
data that satisfies overarching research question without constraining the interviewee to a 
formal structure while ensuring that the conversation remains within the confines of the 
study topic (Payán, Sloane, Illum, Farris, & Lewis, 2017).  
Using semistructured interviews requires researchers to prepare interview 
questions in line with the research question, interview context, culture, norms, 
participants’ understanding of the study topic and provides researchers with the 
opportunity to seek qualification and make follow-up inquiries to gain better specific and 
general insights on the research phenomenon (Desmond et al., 2018; Marrie, Tyrrell, 
Majumdar, & Eurich, 2017). In conducting semistructured interviews, I employed the 
interview protocol (Appendix B) for guiding the interview process.  
Users of qualitative research methods can use multiple data collection instruments 
including semistructured interviews, focus groups, observation, and secondary data 
sources to explore a phenomenon, uncover new insights, and identify areas for future 
research (Değirmenci Uysal & Aydin, 2017; Kegler et al., 2018). Divan, Ludwig, 
Matthews, Motley, and Tomljenovic-Berube (2017) underscored the importance of using 
multiple data collection instruments including secondary sources noting that the approach 
provides a firm foundation for researchers to undertake triangulation which enhances the 
validity and quality of the study’s findings and conclusions.  
Researchers complement structured data collection methods such as interviews 
and surveys with secondary sources including survey reports, seminal reports, archived 
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information, and records, to minimize bias and strengthen the study’s findings and 
enhance the relevance of the inferences from study’s conclusions (Watts et al., 2017). I 
supplemented semistructured interviews with secondary data sources including archived 
annual financial reports published by participating institutions. The secondary sources of 
data document industry best practices and trends in risk management practices and the 
implementation of effective compensation strategies. 
I used member checking to ensure the reliability and validity of the data that I 
collect. Researchers use member checking in qualitative research to assess the 
trustworthiness and credibility of the study’s findings by inviting respondents after data 
collection to verify, confirm, comment, support, or correct the researchers’ data or 
interpretations (Madill & Sullivan, 2018, Varpio et al., 2017). Using member checking, 
researchers provide respondents with an opportunity to reflect on their previous 
submissions, provide additional information, elaborate on the research outcomes or 
challenge inaccurate interpretations by the researcher, which strengthens the level of trust 
and integrity between the researcher and the respondents (Iivari, 2018).  
Naidu and Prose (2018) advised researchers to incorporate member checking in 
the data collection process by using open-ended questions in semistructured interviews to 
increase the participant’s involvement in the research process as well as provide 
respondents with an immediate opportunity to verify, clarify, or correct their responses 
before closing the interview. I conducted member checking by sharing the summary of 
the responses with the participants by e-mail requesting them to check for accuracy as 
well as ensure that the wording matches the respondents' intended meanings to enhance 
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the validity of the data. I referred to the interview protocol (see Appendix B) for guidance 
on the member checking process during the data collection process. 
Data Collection Technique 
Researchers using qualitative research methods can select from a range of data 
collection techniques including survey questionnaires, interviews, observation, and 
document review (Aksan & Baki, 2017; Van den Berg & Struwig, 2017). The data 
collection technique for this study was semistructured interviews with risk management 
executives of participating institutions using open-ended questions (see Appendix A) 
following the interview protocol (see Appendix B). Semistructured interviews are ideal in 
qualitative studies because researchers can ask individual participants questions from a 
list of defined open-ended questions with the flexibility to pose additional probing or 
follow-up questions in line with the study’s research question (Chu & Ke, 2017). 
Following receipt of the IRB approval to collect data, I sent a formal letter to leaders of 
participating institutions seeking consent from their entities to participate in the study. 
After obtaining institutional through a signed letter of cooperation, I informed the 
selected participants via e-mail of their selection and invited them to participate in the 
study by sending them a letter of invitation and informed consent form by e-mail. I 
requested the participants to review and execute the consent forms if they are willing to 
participate in the study. Following receipt of consent, I then ascertained participants’ 
availability, scheduled, and conducted interviews using the interview protocol. 
Garaba (2017) posited that each data collection technique has strengths as well as 
weaknesses and advised researchers to use multiple data collection techniques to avoid 
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bias and ensure the validity and reliability of the data collected. Integrating multiple 
sources of evidence facilitates the process of triangulation by enabling researchers to 
validate data from different sources to ensure the credibility and trustworthiness of the 
study’s findings (Varpio et al., 2017). I reviewed archived documents published by 
participating institutions to explore compensation strategies that commercial bank leaders 
use to support effective risk management practices in the banking sector in Uganda. I 
gathered evidence through the interview protocol, journaling, note-taking, audio 
recording, and the member checking process. Using the interview protocol facilitates the 
gathering of the evidence systematically by guiding researchers on the sequencing of the 
questions (Chung et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 2017). 
Researchers use journals to document notes, observations, and insights as well as 
maintain audit trails for the research process (Impellizzeri, Savinsky, King, & Leitch-
Alford, 2017). Note-taking and maintaining an audio record of the interview enables the 
researcher to accurately record the participants’ responses and facilitate the member 
checking process (Naidu & Prose, 2018). Member checking enables researchers to share 
the gathered data with the different participants for their review, and feedback to ensure 
the accuracy, credibility as well as the reliability of the evidence collected (Smith & 
McGannon, 2017). I paraphrased the participants’ responses for each question and then 
requested the respondents by e-mail to confirm whether I accurately interpreted the 
intended message from their responses to the interview questions (see Appendix B). 
Data collection techniques have limitations. Researchers using semistructured 
interviews might not guarantee the honesty of the participants in responding to the 
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questions, whereas the flexibility of the interview process introduces bias and affects the 
reliability of the study’s findings (Marrie et al., 2017). Castillo-Montoya (2016) posited 
that whereas interview protocols provide a framework for an inquiry-based conversation 
by defining open-ended questions ahead of the interview, several unplanned questions 
emerge during the interview process that might divert the conversation away from the 
research’s purpose. The quality of notetaking depends on the researcher’s skills and 
experience, while participants might refrain from sharing sensitive information if they are 
aware that the researcher is recording the interview (Impellizzeri et al., 2017; Naidu & 
Prose, 2018). Lack of time by the participants to review the transcript summary impacts 
the level of engagement and the quality of feedback to the researchers, which affects the 
validity of the study’s findings and conclusions (Amankwaa, 2016). I used multiple 
sources of evidence, including archived company documents, to manage the weaknesses 
of individual data collection techniques.  
Data Organization Technique 
Cooper (2017) underscored the importance of implementing the necessary data 
storage technics to ensure the safety of research the data, protect the confidentiality of the 
participants. Researchers must prevent unauthorized access to privileged research data by 
implementing physical security measures as well as passwords (Petillion et al., 2016). 
Fleet et al. (2016) advised researchers to protect the privacy, confidentiality, and identity 
of participants by disguising the identity of the respondents through pseudonyms. I will 
securely store hard and electronic copies of the data for 5 years in a fire-proof password-
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access-only vault. I disguised the identity of the participating institutions and participants 
by using confidential codes and pseudonyms.  
Researchers must adopt sound data organization techniques including research 
logs, reflective journals, and catalogs to track, codify and classify research evidence to 
facilitate the transformation of large data sets into information, knowledge, and wisdom 
(Dijkman & Wilbik, 2017; Suriadi, Andrews, ter Hofstede, & Wynn, 2017). Yeoh (2017) 
posited that researchers could use research logs and reflective journals to foster critical as 
they progressively note and chronicle research insights and emerging trends during the 
research process. Naeem (2018) advised researchers to adopt uniform and widely 
accepted data organizational techniques to ensure the accuracy, reliability, completeness, 
conciseness, consistency, and verifiability of data gathered. I used the NVivo 12 software 
to organize data and I will erase all the electronic data as well as burn hard copy 
information after 5 years. 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis a critical stage in the qualitative research process in which the 
researcher uses an array of methods to transform data into actionable insights and 
conclusions in a manner that enables users and reviewers of the study’s findings to 
critically appraise the evidence in the context of extant literature (Raskind et al., 2018). 
Qualitative data analysis involves the review, analysis, synthesis, and categorization of 
research evidence into themes that reveal emerging patterns which satisfy the research 
question (Lowe, Norris, Farris, & Babbage, 2018). Michael (2018) advised researchers to 
enhance the rigor of the research by using triangulation during the data analysis stage to 
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seek peer-review feedback regarding the analysis, synthesis and, interpretation of the data 
as well as confirm the validity of the study’s findings and conclusions.  
Triangulation requires the use of multiple sources of data in a study including 
interviews, observation, journals, field notes enabling researchers to draw strong insights 
from the data because of the depth of the available data and evidence (Desmond et al., 
2018; Taguchi, 2017). Varpio et al. (2017) described investigation triangulation as the 
process where researchers validate data from participants with different perspectives or 
expertise while methodological triangulation involves the validation of collection of data 
from different techniques including interviews, focus groups, observation, public records, 
and seminal work. I applied investigation triangulation by validating data from interviews 
with risk management executives of five different commercial banks with the track 
record of implementing compensation strategies that encourage prudent managerial risk-
taking behavior. I adopted methodological triangulation by validating data through 
semistructured interviews, public records and seminal work on compensation strategies 
that support effective risk management practices.  
Researchers can use triangulation, member checking, sense-making, member 
checking, and data saturation to reduce research bias and enhance the rigor and 
trustworthiness of the study’s findings (Toews et al., 2016). During the data analysis 
stage of the research process researchers compile, disaggregate, aggregate, classify 
related data items as well as interpret and draw conclusions from the emerging themes 
(Michael, 2018; Waree, 2017). Quartiroli, Knight, Etzel, and Monaghan (2017) 
recommended the use of technology to aid the data analysis process observing that during 
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the coding process researchers and participants can view the data transcriptions using 
Skype to facilitate the exchange of unbiased feedback instantly. I used different tools 
during the data analysis stage including audio recording the semistructured interviews, 
note-taking, and ensure the accurate transcription of the interviews and recording of the 
responses in a systematic format to enable coding, interpretation, and reporting.  
I leveraged on technology capabilities, interview recording machines, and NVivo 
during the data analysis stage. The process of disaggregating data involves the in-depth 
review of the data to enable the researcher to explore the evidence and satisfy the what, 
who, where, when, why, and how aspects of the data (Maher et al., 2018). Researchers 
use the coding process to disassemble data to determine aspects of data that are dissimilar 
by defining and assigning data with codes, labels, and descriptions to ensure the 
recording and sequencing of data in a meaningful order (Aldahdouh, 2018; Phillips & Lu, 
2018). I used the NVivo 12 software for data coding to sort, filter, identify possible 
relationships, confirm emerging themes, and analyze and report results.  
Maher et al. (2018) underscored the weaknesses of NVivo and advised 
researchers to complement the software with traditional coding tools including 
notetaking, worksheets, journals, colored pens, and sticky notes. Researchers achieve 
data aggregation through coding by labeling similar data with unique codes, assign 
meaningful descriptions enabling the emergence of mutual themes with varying levels of 
detail to facilitate the structured interpretation of the data to make actionable conclusions 
(Raskind et al., 2018). The data analysis process enables researchers to identify 
relationships and common themes within the data that are relevant to satisfying the 
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research question (Yin, 2018). I used NVivo for the data aggregation, disaggregation and 
complemented the software by using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to tabulate key 
insights to aid the analysis and interpretation of the data in line with the research 
question. Following the interpretation of data, I drew conclusions that are relevant to the 
research question, the conceptual framework, and literature on compensation strategies. 
Reliability and Validity 
In qualitative studies, the rigor and trustworthiness of the study’s findings depend 
on the measure of reliability and validity (Dikko, 2016). Researchers measure validity in 
qualitative studies by establishing credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability of the research process (Yeong, Ismail, Ismail, & Hamzah, 2018). 
Research findings that lack integrity are unreliable, and researchers need to demonstrate 
that the findings are accurate, consistent, replicable, could apply to other contexts as well 
as the extent to which the findings are free from researcher bias, motivation, or interest 
(Amankwaa, 2016). Researchers need to ensure the integrity of the findings by 
maintaining content and criterion validity in the framing of the research questions, 
engaging participants, collecting data, analysis, and interpretation (Yin, 2018). 
Reliability 
Reliability measures the extent to which the consistent application of qualitative 
research practices by different researchers achieves similar findings and conclusions 
(Cypress, 2017). Researchers achieve reliability in qualitative research by demonstrating 
that different researchers can replicate the same research process and achieve the same 
findings and conclusions consistently (Spiers, Morse, Olson, Mayan, & Barrett, 2018). 
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Reliability proves that the results are dependable because the research process is free 
from significant errors and bias (Bolognesi, Pilgram, & van den Heerik, 2016). 
Researchers can use member checking to verify the accuracy, analysis, and interpretation 
of the data to enhance the dependability of the study’s findings (Naidu & Prose, 2018). 
During the member checking process researchers share a summary of the interview 
responses or emerging findings with research participants to confirm data accuracy and 
whether the findings reflect their experiences (Smith & McGannon, 2017).  
Thomas (2017) posited that where the purpose of the research is to represent 
participants’ perspectives or experiences accurately, member checks enhance the rigor 
and dependability of the research findings. Researchers can ensure the dependability of 
the research findings by transparently describing and documenting the various activities 
in the research process from data collection, analysis, and interpretation to the 
presentation of findings in the form of an audit trail (Yin, 2018). I ensured reliability and 
dependability in the research study by conducting member checks with all interview 
participants; maintaining an audio record of all interviews; developing interview 
transcripts for all interviews; and keeping an audit trail of the research process from data 
collection to the presentation of findings. 
Validity 
Yeong et al. (2018) posited that the measurement of validity in qualitative 
research confirms the rigor and trustworthiness of the research findings. Ensuring validity 
in qualitative research is important to researchers in demonstrating the credibility, 
transferability, and confirmability of the research findings (Ricci et al., 2018). Kozleski 
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(2017) advised researchers to ensure validity in qualitative research by sharing emerging 
analysis, and conclusions with research participants for review as well as documenting 
how the research process led to data, insights, findings, inferences, and conclusions. 
Credibility. Credibility entails the implementation of strategies in all the stages of 
the research process to support the authenticity and accuracy of research claims (Liao & 
Hitchcock, 2018). Credibility enables researchers to provide confidence that the research 
findings from the perspective of the participants are accurate, trustworthy and believable 
(Forero et al., 2018). Researchers can promote credibility in qualitative research through 
member checks, peer debriefing, prolonged engagement of participants, audit trails and 
triangulation (Stewart, Gapp, & Harwood, 2017). Triangulation is an important element 
in facilitating the objectivity and trustworthiness of a study’s results (Desmond et al., 
2018). Triangulation involves the use of multiple sources of data to ensure the credibility 
of the study’s inferences and conclusions by mitigating bias, enhancing the depth of the 
evidence, and facilitating data saturation (Taguchi, 2018).  
Researchers undertaking qualitative research can implement four types of 
triangulation to enhance the credibility of social research including data triangulation, 
investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, and methodological triangulation 
(Amankwaa, 2016). Data triangulation involves comparing data from different people 
and periods; investigator triangulation involves correlating evidence from multiple 
researchers in the same study; theoretical triangulation considers diverse theories; and 
methodological triangulation entails correlating data from multiple data collection 
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instruments (Fusch, Fusch, & Ness, 2018). To ensure the credibility of results in the 
study, I used member checking and methodological triangulation. 
Transferability. Transferability in qualitative research entails providing the 
necessary details to enable the reader to determine whether the results of a study are 
applicable in a new but similar context (Yin, 2018). Researchers can ensure 
transferability through thick description which involves describing a phenomenon in 
detail to enable consumers of qualitative research to establish the extent to which the 
results of the study are transferable to other periods, settings and situations (Cypress, 
2017). The use of a purposive sampling method ensures diversity in research participants 
and the inclusion of a wider range of perspectives in the research process which increases 
data trustworthiness and promotes transferability of the study’s findings to other contexts 
(Pratt & Yezierski, 2018). To enhance the quality and usability of qualitative research 
researchers need to implement strategies that promote the consistent replication of 
research practices in different conditions for the reader to justify the transferability of 
research findings to other settings (Carminati, 2018). I satisfied the transferability criteria 
by implementing purposive sampling and thick description. 
Confirmability. Confirmability in qualitative research describes the degree of the 
extent to which respondents shape the findings of a study and not the researcher’s bias, 
motivation, or interest (Amankwaa, 2016). Researchers can achieve confirmability 
through member checking, triangulation, audit trails, and by keeping a reflexive journal 
of notes that describe the researcher’s evolving self-awareness regarding the phenomenon 
to mitigate bias (Astroth & Chung, 2018). Pratt and Yezierski (2018) advised researchers 
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to use member checking through peer debriefing sessions and participant feedback to 
ensure the confirmability of the research findings.  
Using triangulation techniques including methodological, data source, 
investigators and theoretical triangulation, researchers can promote confirmability by 
demonstrating the extent to which other researchers confirm or corroborate the study’s 
findings (Forero et al., 2018). Audit trails enable researchers to examine the integrity of 
the processes for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data, while reflexive journals 
help to document daily introspections throughout the research process to mitigate 
researcher bias and interest (Cypress, 2017). I ensured confirmability in the study through 
member checking, triangulation, reflexivity and keeping audit trails. 
Data saturation. Researchers in qualitative research can ensure the 
trustworthiness of the research findings by evidencing data saturation (Astroth & Chung, 
2018; Pratt & Yezierski, 2018). Data saturation occurs when collecting additional data 
does not reveal new themes in response to the research question (Ricci et al., 2018). 
Thematic saturation when additional information does not reveal new themes while 
theoretical saturation occurs when collecting more data fails to develop further the 
qualitative theory (Carminati, 2018; Lowe et al., 2018). Forero et al. (2018) posited that 
researchers could achieve data saturation by tracking codes per interview over time until 
no new codes emerge from conducting additional interviews and confirming that 
sufficient information is available to respond to the research question. I achieved data 
saturation by increasing the number of research participants using purposive sampling 
until no new insights emerge from collecting additional data. 
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Transition and Summary 
In Section 2, I present the project plan of the study by reiterating the purpose of 
the study and underscoring the role of the researcher in the research process. I discuss the 
study’s participants, research methods and design. An examination of the research 
elements in the study including population and sampling, ethical research practices, data 
collection instruments, data collection technique, data organization technique, and data 
analysis follows. I discuss the various techniques I implemented in the study to ensure the 
reliability and validity of the research findings including credibility, transferability, 
confirmability and data saturation. In Section 3, I present the research findings and 
discuss their application to professional practice as well as their implications for social 
change. A review of the recommendations for action and areas for future research follow. 
I reflect on my experiences during the doctoral research process and end the dissertation 
with conclusive remarks. 
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Introduction 
In this qualitative multiple case study, the purpose was to explore compensation 
strategies that some executives in Uganda use to support effective risk management 
practices. I conducted semistructured interviews with organizational leaders at five 
commercial banks in Uganda who were risk management executives charged with 
implementing the risk management program in their institutions who had (a) successfully 
implemented compensation strategies that support prudent risk management practices and 
(b) had risk management experience of more than 5 years at a senior level in the financial 
services sector. I transcribed the interviews, conducted member checking with each 
participant, and employed the NVIVO 12 software for data analysis to code, sort, filter, 
identify relationships, and confirm emerging themes. I used methodological triangulation 
to corroborate data from the interviews using related information from archived company 
annual financial reports. The primary themes include (a) compensation challenges, (b) 
financial and nonfinancial compensation, (c) the effectiveness of compensation, and (d) 
effective implementation of compensation strategies.  
In this section, I will present the research findings and discuss their application to 
professional practice and implications for social change. I will also present 
recommendations for action and discuss areas for future research. Finally, I will reflect 
on my doctoral journey experiences and make conclusive remarks. 
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Presentation of the Findings 
The overarching research question for the study was “What compensation 
strategies do some executives in Uganda use to support effective risk management 
practices?” To answer the research question, I interviewed five risk management 
executives of five commercial banks in Uganda with experience in implementing 
compensation strategies that support effective risk management practices. To maintain 
confidentiality and protect the participants’ identity in presenting the findings, I labeled 
the participants as P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 and the participating institutions as Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, 
Q5. I employed Microsoft Word in transcribing the data and NVivo 12 software to assist 
with data analysis.  
After applying methodological triangulation, I identified four themes related to 
compensation strategies that support commercial banks’ effective risk management 
practices: (a) compensation challenges, (b) financial and nonfinancial compensation, (c) 
the effectiveness of compensation, and (d) effective implementation of compensation. 
Two subthemes emerged regarding compensation challenges: (a) risky behavior, and (b) 
competition and high wage costs. Three subthemes emerged under financial and 
nonfinancial compensation: (a) fixed financial compensation strategies, (b) variable 
financial compensation strategies and (c) nonfinancial compensation strategies. Two 
subthemes emerged regarding the effectiveness of compensation: (a) risk indicators and 
(b) financial indicators. Finally, two subthemes emerged on the effective implementation 
of compensation: (a) effective governance, and (b) risk-based performance measures. 
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Theme 1: Compensation Challenges 
All the participants in the study emphasized the importance of identifying and 
managing the key risks and challenges involved in implementing compensation strategies 
that drive the right risk management behavior. The participants mentioned that the key 
risk or unintended consequence of compensation strategies is the potential for 
encouraging the wrong behavior as managers exploit the performance and reward process 
to maximize their earnings at the expense of the organization and other stakeholders’ 
interests. P1 indicated that “forms of variable compensation such as bonus and 
commission drive the wrong behavior by encouraging short-term risk-taking, especially if 
the reward does not reward employees for achieving the bank’s long-term goals.” P2 
noted that stock options could promote the wrong behavior by encouraging staff to drive 
short-term sales numbers: “if the reward does not support the achievement of the long-
term risk-based performance objectives of the firm.” P5 also observed that sales 
commission could drive the wrong behavior leading to high dormant accounts, significant 
account-write-offs if account balances or quality of loans is not a key condition for 
earning the commission. Financial performance-based compensation may encourage 
managers to misrepresent accounting results to increase their remuneration (Almadi & 
Lazic, 2016). 
All the participants also mentioned intense competition and rivalry as the main 
challenge in implementing compensation strategies because banks offer high 
compensation packages to attract and retain staff, leading to high compensation costs 
across the industry. P3 mentioned that from an external risk perspective, one of the key 
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challenges with implementing compensation strategies is “the intense competition and 
rivalry from financial and non-financial institutions that compete for the limited talent by 
increasing compensation packages.” P4 also noted competition and rivalry from other 
banks as a key challenge with most of the banks in the industry: “similar or better 
compensation strategies making it difficult to retain staff due to cost constraints.” 
Research has also indicated that rivalry for employees increases wage costs, as some 
managers earn high incentives regardless of their abilities, effort, and the entity’s 
performance (Hill, Lopez, & Reitenga, 2016). Two subthemes from this theme also 
emerged: (a) risky behavior and (b) competition and high wage costs. 
Subtheme 1: Risky behavior. The participants indicated that variable 
compensation strategies could encourage managerial excessive risk-taking behavior if the 
reward structure focuses on achieving short-term accounting results. Reward structures 
may provide incentives for managers to undertake high-risk investments due to the 
aggressive pay-for-performance culture in the banking sector that underscores short-term 
performance (Abrokwah et al., 2018). Firms with compensation strategies that rely on 
accounting performance indicators encourage managers to ignore low-risk projects in 
favor of high-risk projects that generate short-term accounting earnings (Kang & Nanda, 
2017). Thus, variable compensation strategies can drive the right managerial-risk taking 
behavior to assist institutions in achieving sustainable performance objectives. Table 1 
provides the key terms that refer to the link between compensation and risky behavior for 








percentage     Similar words 
Risk 60 2.72 Risks 
Behavior 38 1.72 behavioral, behaviors 
Driving 28 1.27 drive, drives, driving 
Wrong 26 1.18 - 
Short 25 1.13 - 
Fraud 18 0.81 fraud, frauds 
Taking 14 0.63 Take 
Challenge  08 0.36 challenges, challenging 
 
All five executives cited the need to watch out for the unintended consequences 
of variable compensation strategies in promoting managerial excessive risk-taking 
behavior. P1 noted that  
forms of variable compensation such as bonus and commission drive the wrong 
behavior that it is not sustainable because they encourage short-term risk-taking, 
especially if the incentives do not support the attainment of the set risk-based 
performance objectives of the firm.  
P1 also mentioned that when a firm’s compensation structure emphasizes variable pay-
for-performance incentives ahead of fixed compensation:  
staff do not have assurance or certainty of a minimum earning which drives them 
to do other businesses outside the bank to make ends meet, causing them to have 
divided attention while at work as well as engage in fraud. 
P2 shared a similar experience where sales commissions encouraged the wrong sales 
practices, noting that “due to the competitive nature of the sales teams and a reward 
structure focusing on the number of new accounts rather than the quality of the accounts, 
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sales staff attracted many low-value accounts to earn a commission.” To manage this 
challenge, P2 noted that the bank worked “to align incentives to long-term performance 
with call-back provisions so that we ultimately get people to think strategically and not 
tactically and that drove the right behavior.”  
P5 shared the same sentiments, noting that “sales commissions drive the wrong 
risk behavior unfortunately and the main reason as to why the bank has a huge number of 
dormant accounts, the high growth in the number of accounts, but the value add is almost 
negligible.” P4 mentioned that although forms of variable pay such as bonuses drive 
performance and motivate staff, especially for business functions, the behavior is short 
term. P4 indicated that bonus motivates staff to drive better performance staff, but after a 
few months, they forget about it and begin focusing on the next incentive, salary 
increment, or promotions. P4 noted that “bonus is a very short-term incentive that drives 
the wrong behavior by encouraging and rewarding short-term results, it is not a major 
tool for motivating staff in the long-term and therefore the bank does not necessarily pay 
big bonuses.” Noting similar challenges with bonus, P5 mentioned that the bank reviewed 
its bonus structure and indicated that “previously the bonus structure was the same for all 
staff at all levels across all functions, but now it encourages the right behavior, drives 
better performance and financial results, sustainable growth and not short-term risk and 
short-term rewards.” 
According to P3, variable pay-for-performance incentives that reward staff for 
achieving results over a 1-year accounting period drive the wrong behavior, especially if 
staff achieve their targets earlier. P3 noted that when treasurers meet their targets within 6 
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months, you see their behavior change, “they come in at 10:00 am and leave at 3:00 pm 
because they are done for the year yet there are customer needs to meet and potential for 
the bank to increase its performance.” P4 shared a similar experience in this regard, 
noting that measuring staff performance for reward purposes at the end of the year 
encourages staff to take excessive short-term risk to earn a big bonus and start the 
following year fresh or change employers. P4 noted the need to “reward long-term 
sustainable risk-based performance beyond one year and underscored the importance of 
assurance functions such as risk management, compliance, and audit in ensuring that the 
bank rewards staff for prudent risk-taking behavior.”  
My review of annual reports of the participating financial institutions revealed 
disclosures on performance, compensation, and risk management practices that 
corroborate participants’ responses and the need to implement structures to mitigate the 
unintended consequences of variable compensation. In all the five participating 
institutions, the board, with the assistance of the respective remuneration subcommittees, 
approves executive remuneration in recognition of outstanding risk-based performance 
against set long-term objectives of the banks. At the center of each of the participating 
institutions’ reward philosophy is the implementation of fixed and variable compensation 
strategies that are fair, competitive, and support the long-term risk-based performance of 
the banks. 
Subtheme 2: Competition and high wage costs. The participants also mentioned 
that competition and rivalry between banks in the market to attract or retain staff forces 
banks to offer high compensation packages to employees, leading to unsustainable 
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compensation costs. Firms use higher compensation packages to gain a competitive edge 
against rivals to attract or retain key talent, generate high returns, and increase 
shareholder value (Jung & Subramanian, 2017). But firms need to determine the 
appropriate and affordable level of fixed pay when attracting or retaining staff to avoid 
escalating operating costs (Tóth, 2016). Risk management executives need to implement 
competitive compensation packages are that are affordable and commensurate with the 
firm’s performance and financial strength. Table 2 provides the key terms that refer to the 
link between competition and high wage costs for all interviews, reflecting a combined 
frequency of 10.81% of all participant’s responses. 
Table 2 
 
Competition and High Wage Costs 
Reference Frequency 
Weighted 
percentage     Similar words 
Bank 44 2.23 banking, banks 
Challenges 41 2.08 challenge, challenging 
Cost 29 1.47 costly, costs 
Competition 28 1.42 Competitive 
Market 23 1.17 Marketable 
Talent 20 1.01 - 
Industry 10 0.51 - 
Rivalry 10 0.51 - 
Attrition  08 0.41 Turnover 
 
All the five executives mentioned competition for talent and the attendant 
increase in the wage bill as one of the key challenges in implementing compensation 
strategies that support risk management practices. P1 noted that  
from an external risk perspective, our main challenge is the threat of competition 
and rivalry because we have many banks with competitive packages in the 
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industry, which do not match our packages and this has led to high staff attrition 
with staff looking for better and huge packages elsewhere. 
P1 also said that “banks face competition for talent from non-bank financial institutions 
such as mobile network operators (MNOs), and microfinance firms who also offer very 
competitive compensation packages to key talent leading to staff attrition.” P3 had 
similar concerns, indicated that one of the challenges in implementing compensation 
strategies was “intense competition and rivalry from financial and non-financial 
institutions that compete for the limited talent by increasing compensation strategies.” P1 
mentioned that although the bank endeavors to offer competitive compensation packages 
to retain key, the approach is not sustainable: 
The biggest percentage of the bank’s operating expenses is staff cost, so if we 
cannot reduce the wage bill, then our cost to income ratio will breach our target; 
therefore, as a bank, we can only operate within resource constraints. 
According to P2,  
one of the challenges we have with implementing compensation is that we operate 
within cost constraints, and we cannot pay people whether it is from a fixed or 
variable perspective significant amounts of money to deter them from committing 
fraud or going to the highest bidder. 
P2 observed that  
the market is ripe with rivalry where our competitors can artificially increase 
compensation for their staff and lead the market to attract staff and after that, the 
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employee’s compensation may stay stagnant or receive marginal increases in the 
subsequent period. 
P2 indicated that they were managing the threat of competition by constantly reviewing 
their compensation strategies through market surveys and peer reviews to ensure 
alignment with the competition. P3 also emphasized the need for regulatory intervention 
to regulate compensation practices in the wake of intense competition and rivalry. P3 
stated that “with intense competition and rivalry banks tend to manipulate compensation 
to attract and retain the best talent and therefore important to ensure that there are strong 
compensation regulations and that banks comply with prudential guidelines.”  
P4 also emphasized the threat from competition and the high cost of 
compensation: “the bank has resorted to using non-financial compensation strategies to 
address the threat of attrition due to high compensation packages from the competition 
which we cannot match.” P5 cited recent developments in the market due to intense 
competition where banks provide incentives such as sign-on or welcome bonuses or 
guaranteed upfront payments for new hires. P5 stated that although “the payment is a 
one-off, it increases the payroll cost and demotivates other staff, especially in periods 
where the bank does not pay a bonus considering that bonus payment is discretionary.”  
A review of annual reports for the participating institutions revealed the 
significance of staff costs to the financial performance of the financial institutions, 
emphasizing the need to provide competitive but affordable compensation strategies to 
foster firm efficiency and increase shareholder value. For the financial year ending 2018, 
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employee benefit expenses constituted between 31% to 55% of the institutions’ total 
operating expenses and between 23% to 40% of the institutions’ total operating income. 
Links to the literature. All the participants agreed that variable compensation 
strategies could encourage managerial excessive risk-taking behavior if the incentives 
reward employees for achieving short term accounting results. According to John Harry 
et al. (2018), 93% of S&P 1500 firms surveyed for the period 2009 to 2013 preferred 
short-term incentive awards that encourage excessive risk-taking to structures that align 
with the long-term interests of shareholders. Bettis et al. (2017) cautioned firms against 
adopting performance-contingent incentives that focus on accounting targets because 
they provide employees perverse incentives to make short-term decisions contrary to 
shareholders’ interests. Driver and Guedes (2017) noted that strong forms of pay-for-
performance incentives could encourage managers to limit R&D spending in pursuit of 
short-term personal wealth. Nguyen et al. (2017) challenged regulators to implement risk-
based supervisory measures and sanctions that prevent executives from exploiting 
deficiencies in risk management practices to increase short-term bank performance in 
pursuit of higher compensation. The participants decried the increasing cost of 
compensation on account of intense competition and rivalry for talent in the industry, 
noting the need to provide remuneration packages that are competitive and affordable.  
Shan and Walter (2016) argued that while fixed compensation considers the 
availability and market value of managerial talent variable compensation reflects the 
performance of the firm in a financial period by rewarding acceptable risk-taking 
behavior. Cheng et al. (2015) advised firms to implement strong pay-for-performance 
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incentives that incentivize managers to maximize firm value arguing that the gains from 
paying higher managerial compensation can offset the costs of excessive risk-taking 
behavior. Chen et al. (2017) underscored the need for alignment between shareholders, 
managers, and debt holders’ interests in designing compensation structures to mitigate the 
unintended consequences of compensation, including the high employee costs. Eufinger 
and Gill (2016) advised compensation committees to monitor and revise the firm’s risk-
taking incentives to ensure that compensation packages are affordable and competitive. 
Links to the conceptual framework. The findings of this study to the extent that 
variable compensation can encourage excessive risk-taking behavior are in alignment 
with the theory of the firm, which is the conceptual framework of this study. According 
to the theory of the firm, the prices of debt and outside equity under perfect market 
conditions reflect the high agency costs as managers engage in activities contrary to the 
interests of creditors and shareholders (Guthrie et al., 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
According to the theory of the firm managers with no controlling interest in the firm take 
excessive risk and make decisions that appeal to their short-term interests, yet creditors 
and shareholders rely on the contractual agency relationship to protect their rights (Kang 
& Kim, 2016; Van Bekkum, 2016). Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) drew insights from 
the theory to advise remuneration committees to implement incentive schemes that align 
reward to the long-term performance of the projects.  
Firms could drive managerial long-term risk-taking behavior by implementing a 
range of compensation strategies including salary, bonuses, stock options, deferred and 
negative incentive practices (Jensen & Murphy 1990). Dhole et al. (2015) emphasized the 
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role of deferred and negative incentives in aligning managers’ expectations with the long-
term goals of the shareholders. The theory of the firm aligns with the findings 
underscoring the need for firms to provide competitive and affordable compensation 
strategies to minimize agency costs and preserve shareholder value. Chng and Wang 
(2016) advised organizational leaders to manage agency costs by implementing 
compensation structures that align with the managers’ ethical values to encourage 
prudent managerial risk-taking behavior. Kang and Kim (2016) drew insights from the 
theory of the firm, and the agency theory to advocate for the implementation of 
compensation strategies that meet the intrinsic goals of managers and not focus solely on 
financial forms of compensation. The findings from the study are consistent with the 
theory of the firm, which is the conceptual framework for this study. 
Theme 2: Financial and Nonfinancial Compensation 
All the participants mentioned that they implement a combination of financial and 
non-financial compensation strategies that support effective risk management practices. 
Under financial compensation strategies, the participants mentioned that their institutions 
have fixed and variable remuneration structures. Compensation trends in the financial 
services sector in the United States indicate that stock and performance shares comprise 
the highest form of compensation at 34%, basic pay 18%, stock options 19%, while other 
forms of compensation comprise 29% of total compensation (Ting & Huang, 2018). 
According to P1, the bank’s compensation strategies include fixed and variable. P1 stated 
that “on the fixed side, we have a salary, medical allowance, housing allowance, pension, 
and retirement benefits schemes.” P3 mentioned that the bank’s fixed compensation 
95 
 
strategy includes “salary, medical, pension, retirement benefits, subsidized staff loans,” 
while the variable pay structure includes “sales incentives and bonus.”  
P4 had a similar experience with compensation strategies noting that “some are 
fixed compensation strategies such as salaries, medical insurance, mortgages at half the 
commercial rate, airtime, vehicle allowance, life insurance policies, pension schemes, 
retirement benefit schemes, and others variable such as commission and bonus.” P5 
confirmed that similar to other banks, they have “the entire suite of financial and non-
financial compensation strategies, including basic pay, medical, commission, bonus, and 
other non-monetary rewards to staff.” P2 underscored the role of non-financial 
compensation noting that “we cannot pay people whether it is from a fixed perspective or 
variable perspective significant amounts of money to deter them from committing fraud 
because we don’t understand all the pressures they are facing.” Each of the five 
participants agreed that fixed financial compensation drives the right employee behavior 
because the strategy provides employees with assurance and certainty in meeting their 
periodic financial requirements. Teti et al. (2017) argued that firms with independent 
board members set optimum fixed compensation strategies for executives that encourage 
managers to select less risky mergers and acquisition transactions.  
All the participants mentioned that variable compensation strategies could drive 
the right performance behavior if compensation aligns with the long-term objectives of 
the firm. Firms need to drive performance by ensuring that variable compensation aligns 
with the entity’s long-term performance goals (Acharya et al., 2016; Leão et al., 2017). 
The participants mentioned that financial compensation is not a sustainable form of 
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compensation in supporting effective risk management practices and underscored the 
importance of non-financial compensation. Firms can use non-monetary benefits such as 
cars, yachts, or jets, club memberships, travel expenses, housing, medical insurance, and 
entertainment to complement financial compensation in encouraging prudent risk-taking 
behavior (Ting & Huang, 2018). Following my analysis of the data from semistructured 
interviews and methodological triangulation, three subthemes emerged: (a) fixed 
financial compensation strategies, (b) variable financial compensation strategies, and (c) 
non-financial compensation strategies. 
Subtheme 1: Fixed financial compensation strategies. All the participants 
mentioned that fixed financial compensation could drive the right managerial risk-taking 
behavior by providing staff with the certainty of a stable financial reward to meet their 
minimum financial requirements consistently. Kang and Kim (2016) argued that debt-like 
compensation strategies such as pension or deferred compensation encourage managers 
to make prudent risk decisions that prioritize debtholders’ goals. Managers with 
significant fixed compensation positions manage firms conservatively and avoid 
excessive risk in pursuit of high pension and deferred compensation in the future which 
stifles innovation, growth and firm value (Chen & Qiu, 2016; Yang & Hou, 2016). Table 
3 provides the key terms that refer to the link between financial fixed compensation and 
managerial risk behavior for all interviews, reflecting a combined frequency of 13.95% of 





Fixed Financial Compensation Strategies 
Reference Frequency 
Weighted 
percentage     Similar words 
Pay 47 3.12 Paying 
Fixed 44 2.92 - 
Certainty 31 2.06 - 
Loans 26 1.66 Loan 
Salary 18 1.20 Salaries 
Drive 17 1.13 drives, driving 
Behavior 15 1.00 Behavioral 
risk  13 0.86 Risks 
 
Compensation committees need to implement compensation strategies with an 
optimum level of fixed and variable financial compensation structures to support 
effective risk management practices. All five executives mentioned that fixed financial 
compensation strategies provide employees with the assurance of a minimum earning and 
promote prudent risk management behavior. P1 indicated that “fixed pay can drive the 
right behavior if adequate and well-structured because it provides staff with a sense of 
safety, or certainty of their future with the institution.” P1 mentioned that the bank 
provides staff with staff loans at interest rates that are below market rate, which gives 
staff certainty and manages staff attrition risk and fraud.  P1 cautioned that “if salaries are 
low, staff run other businesses outside the bank to make additional money, causes them to 
have divided attention while at work and may also encourage them to engage in fraud.”  
P2 mentioned that fixed compensation “drives the right behavior because it 
provides staff with assurance that they will be able to meet their basic requirements in 
exchange for their efforts.” P2 stated that “from a fixed compensation standpoint when 
employees are confident of meeting their bills as they fall due, they will not engage in 
98 
 
bad conduct.” P2 underscored the importance of staff loans “that a competitive fixed pay 
structure provides certainty to the job market and helps in attraction and retention, but it 
also incentivizes staff to do the right thing for the bank because the ability to pay that 
loan depends on the performance of the bank.” P3 emphasized the importance of fixed 
pay in driving the right risk behavior specifically for support functions noting that 
“although business functions also need a minimum level of fixed pay, pay-for-
performance incentives such as bonus or sales commissions drive behavior more than 
salary.” P3 noted that “once you give a direct sales agent a huge salary, it does not create 
a sense of responsibility to put in more effort because the agent is certain of receiving a 
salary regardless of effort because it is a monthly obligation for the company.”  
P2 concurred with P3 on the matter, noting that “fixed pay tends to drive the right 
behavior especially for support functions because it provides certainty of appropriate 
compensation that does not depend on the performance of the firm and empowers non-
business functions to perform their roles independently.” P4 mentioned that “the bank 
focuses on ensuring that the fixed compensation package is competitive because fixed 
pay provides employees with the assurance of meeting their financial obligations in a 
more defined and sustainable manner.” P4 mentioned that staff loans or mortgages 
“commit staff to the bank for the long-term because they provide staff with the certainty 
of owning a home or car and staff work hard to service the facilities because they do not 
want to lose their assets.” P5 indicated “that fixed pay motivates staff by providing a 
cushion that ensures that employees are certain of meeting their minimum financial 
obligations sustainably.” P5 noted that the bank could attract, retain and motivate staff 
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using fixed pay by offering a salary, other benefits, and medical allowances that provide 
staff with the appropriate level of compensation to meet their financial and growth needs 
sustainably. P5 added that “fixed compensation strategies motivate staff because of the 
stability, certainty, assurance, transparency, and simplicity they provide.” My review of 
disclosures on remuneration in the annual reports of the participating financial 
institutions confirmed information from the interviews to the effect that all the 
participating financial institutions implement financial compensation strategies with fixed 
and variable components as well as additional forms of non-financial compensation. 
Subtheme 2: Variable financial compensation strategies. The participants 
mentioned that variable financial compensation could drive the right performance 
behavior for business functions if the structure rewards staff for achieving the long-term 
objectives of the firm. Ahmed and Ndayisaba (2017) posited that long-term variable 
compensation structures reduce the level of managerial risk-taking behavior and increase 
shareholder value. Appropriate variable compensation strategies influence both the 
operating and market performance of a firm positively (Yahya & Ghazali, 2017). 
Zagonov and Salganik-Shoshan (2017) argued that optimum variable compensation 
strategies influence managerial risk-taking decisions and positively shapes the firm’s 
long-term performance culture. Table 4 provides the key terms that refer to the link 
between variable financial compensation and firm performance for all interviews, 





Variable Financial Compensation Strategies 
Reference Frequency 
Weighted 
percentage Similar words 
Performance 53 5.73 performers, performing 
Business 25 2.70 - 
Driving 25 2.70 drive, drives 
Bonus 22 2.38 - 
Variable 22 2.38 - 
Behavior 14 1.51 - 
Incentives 13 1.41 Incentive 
Commission 12 1.30 Commissions 
Sales  9 0.97 - 
 
Business leaders need to implement compensation strategies with effective 
variable financial compensation structures to motivate business staff to meet the long-
term risk-based performance objectives of the firm. All the five executives mentioned 
that variable compensation supports effective risk management practices if the structure 
rewards staff for achieving the firm’s set long-term risk-based performance objectives. P1 
mentioned that the bank successfully implements “variable pay-for-performance 
strategies such as bonus and sales commission using risk-based performance measures 
that align with the long-term goals of the bank to drive performance for business units.” 
P2 emphasized the importance the bank attaches to variable compensation in driving 
business performance noting that “for staff in business or sales bonus or sales 
commission makes more sense in driving the right performance behavior, but we make 
sure that the structure aligns with the bank’s risk appetite framework.” P2 stated that 
“while compensating business staff with variable incentives for better performance, we 
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ensure that such performance is sustainable over the long term by engaging in the right 
risk-taking behavior.”  
P3 mentioned that pay-for-performance incentives reward excellent performance 
regardless of staff seniority, noting that “you could find a teller who earns more than their 
immediate supervisor in recognition of effort, work ethic, and dedication.” P4 mentioned 
that the bank implements “variable incentive schemes such as bonus, commissions 
mainly for the business functions that help drive performance.” P4 cautioned that 
whereas variable incentives schemes such as bonus, sales commission, can drive the right 
behavior performance behavior, the impact is not sustainable. P4 stated that “bonus is 
quite interesting because it drives performance and motivates staff during the reward 
period, but performance declines or remains stable for the period following the payment.” 
P4 noted that variable compensation could drive sustainable business performance “if the 
pay structure rewards staff for achieving the bank’s long-term goals.”  
P5 noted that variable incentives schemes such as bonus and sales commissions 
could “motivate staff in business functions in driving better performance and support the 
bank's long-term objectives.” P5 emphasized the need for a structure “that fosters the 
right behavior and drives sustainable performance by implementing risk-based 
performance measures that support the long-term goals of the bank.” P5 underscored the 
impact of implementing incentive deferral methods in driving prudent risk behavior 
noting that “a bonus deferral method at 40% in year 1, 30% in year 2 and 30% in year 3 
is risk-sensitive, supports staff retention drives sustainable performance.” A review of 
disclosures on remuneration in the annual reports of the participating financial 
102 
 
institutions confirmed that the banks implement variable pay-for-performance 
compensation that aims to reward deserving staff for achieving the long-term financial 
and non-financial objectives of the firm. 
Subtheme 3: Nonfinancial compensation strategies. All five participants 
emphasized the importance of non-financial forms of compensation such as training and 
other non-monetary ways of applauding commendable staff performance in managing 
staff attrition. Firms can motivate staff through non-monetary benefits such as cars, club 
memberships, travel expenses, housing, medical insurance, entertainment, and other 
forms of recognition (Ting & Huang, 2018). Non-monetary forms of motivation such as 
the opportunity to succeed, a conducive work environment, and self-actualization 
supplement financial compensation in motivating staff and driving prudent risk-taking 
behavior (Davis et al., 1997; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2018).  
Executives of firms listed in Fortune ’s ranking of America’s top companies 
earned 8% lower compared to peers in other firms, preferring status and career benefits to 
additional financial compensation (Focke et al., 2017). Table 5 provides the key terms 
that refer to the link between non-financial firms of competition and risk behavior for all 
interviews, reflecting a combined frequency of 28.53% of all participant’s responses. 
Business leaders, regulators, and policymakers need to implement non-monetary forms of 
compensation to motivate managers by appealing to their intrinsic values of managers. 
All the participants underscored the role of non-financial compensation strategies in 






Nonfinancial Compensation Strategies 
Reference Frequency 
Weighted 
percentage    Similar words 
Compensation 29 9.51 - 
Non 24 7.87 - 
Forms 17 5.57 Form 
Motivator 5 2.30 motivated, motivating, motivation 
Rewards  4 1.64 Reward 
Strategies 3 0.98 - 
Awards 2 0.66 - 
 
P1 mentioned that the bank “supplements financial compensation with non-
financial forms of compensation including "thank you notes," formal or verbal 
recognition, awards because of their appeal to the intrinsic values of employees and plays 
a critical role in driving the right risk-taking behavior.” P1 mentioned that “non-financial 
compensation including promotion, team building events, as well as social and family 
events provide emotional support, motivate staff and help mitigate several organizational 
risks that arise out of compensation packages.”  
P2 supported the need to implement compensation strategies with an optimum 
mix of both financial and non-financial forms of compensation. P2 mentioned that 
“financial institutions should realize that it is not a one-size-fits-all for all staff in terms of 
motivating staff especially as we recruit a younger staff compliment, we find that money 
is not the only source of motivation.” P2 shared a similar experience and emphasized the 
need to “compliment financial forms of compensation with other non-financial forms of 
compensation, including appreciation, recognition, awards.” P2 acknowledged the 
limitations of financial compensation noting that “because pay can never be [good 
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enough] financial compensation can only take you so far and so you need to use non-
financial compensation because it makes staff feel special.” P3 noted that with intense 
competition and rivalry for talent with banks offering lucrative financial compensation 
packages, “the bank emphasizes non-financial forms of compensation to appeal to staff 
and improve employee retention.” P4 underscored the importance of non-financial 
compensation in staff retention, stating that “people stay, not just for financial 
compensation but for other reasons such as a good working environment, work-life 
balance, growth opportunities, and exposure.”  
P5 indicated that the bank uses “non-financial compensation strategies to address 
the threat of attrition due to high compensation packages from competition to attract 
talent that the bank cannot match.” P5 mentioned that “the bank emphasizes non-
financial forms of compensation including opportunities for growth, noting that financial 
compensation cannot drive sustainable employee behavior.” P1 concurred with P5, noting 
that “job enrichment by providing staff with more exposure and challenging opportunities 
are forms of non-financial compensation that motivate staff beyond financial reward.” A 
review of disclosures on remuneration in the annual reports of the participating financial 
institutions confirmed the use of non-financial forms of compensation, including training, 
growth opportunities, recognition, and awards to complement financial rewards. 
Links to the literature. All the participants mentioned that fixed financial 
compensation provides staff with the certainty of a stable financial reward and drives the 
right risk-taking behavior. Kang and Kim (2016) posited that fixed compensation 
incentives including pension and deferred payments, motivate managers to reduce risk by 
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aligning the managers’ and creditors’ reward expectations because they both rely on a 
promise for payment in the future. Firms that offer fixed incentives encourage managers 
to become risk-averse because such incentives are subject to a high risk of default when 
the firm’s financial performance is poor (Van Bekkum, 2016). Chi et al. (2017) noted that 
fixed compensation strategies encourage managers to adopt a risk-averse approach to 
protect their future pension benefits and deferred compensation reward at the expense of 
the firm’s long-term performance.  
The participants agreed that pay-for-performance variable financial compensation 
could drive a risk-based performance culture for business functions. Variable 
compensation strategies with penalties for poor performance and unethical behavior 
could increase the firm’s ability to achieve its long-term performance goals (Koch et al., 
2017). Firms with pay-for-performance variable incentives pay their managers more 
incentives in search for greater success and pay managers whose performance is below 
target less compensation (Boodoo, 2018). Firms need to design compensation structures 
that have fixed and variable incentives to motivate staff to achieve the firm’s long-term 
objectives (Petrou & Procopiou, 2016). Abrokwah et al. (2018) noted that when variable 
compensation supports the achievement of the firm’s long-term performance, managerial 
risk-taking aligns with the firm’s strategic objectives and increases shareholder value. 
Adom (2018) posited that while variable compensation strategies might demotivate staff 
who fail to meet the aggressive set targets, the incentives improve employee work 
performance and retention. Smirnova and Zavertiaeva (2017) cautioned that while 
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incentives motivate managers to achieve accounting-based results, such incentives might 
not motivate managers to achieve market-based results.  
Savaser (2016) advised that pay-for-performance incentives could induce more 
risk-taking, arguing that risky projects create more value and increase the expected value 
of incentive compensation. Anderson and Core (2017) urged firms to implement risk-
reducing incentives such as future cash pay, pension benefits, deferred compensation, and 
severance pay strategies. All five participants emphasized the importance of non-
financial forms of compensation in managing staff attrition and mitigating risks attendant 
to financial compensation strategies. Francoeur et al. (2015) argued that managers with 
intrinsic goals, such as caring for the environment, prioritize intrinsic rewards ahead of 
monetary gain. A compensation framework that emphasizes the maximization of short-
term monetary gain encourages adverse managerial risk-taking behavior (Hoskisson et 
al., 2016; Rocchi & Thunder, 2017).  
Links to the conceptual framework. The findings of this study requiring firms 
to implement an optimum mix of non-financial and financial forms of compensation 
including fixed and variable compensation to drive the right risk-taking behavior, align 
with the theory of the firm, which is the conceptual framework of this study. The theory 
of the firm explores the connection between pay-for-performance incentives and 
managers’ risk-taking behavior (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). According to the theory, firms 
have several stakeholders with conflicting objectives, and pay-for-performance incentives 
might influence managers’ risk-taking behavior to focus on increasing their wealth to the 
detriment of owners, creditors, and the public (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Kang and Kim 
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(2016) posited that fixed compensation strategies including pension and deferred 
payments motivate managers to reduce risk by aligning the managers’ and creditors’ 
reward expectations because they both rely on a promise for payment in the future.  
According to the theory of the firm managers with no controlling interest in the 
firm make decisions that appeal to their short-term interests, requiring the need to 
implement optimum compensation strategies to the interests of all stakeholders (Kang & 
Kim, 2016; Van Bekkum, 2016). Pogach (2018) advised firms to manage staff attrition, 
emphasizing the need for firms to implement optimal compensation strategies that 
motivate managers to act in the long-term interest of the firm. Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994) drew insights from the theory of the firm to encourage remuneration committees 
to implement compensation strategies that align reward to the long-term performance 
objectives of the firm. Jensen and Murphy (1990) posited that firms could drive 
managerial long-term risk-taking behavior by implementing a range of financial and non-
financial compensation strategies including salary, bonuses, stock options, deferred, 
negative incentive practices and other non-monetary rewards. The findings are consistent 
with the theory of the firm, which is the conceptual framework for this study. 
Theme 3: The Effectiveness of Compensation 
All the participants mentioned that they measure the effectiveness of their 
compensation strategies by tracking risk and financial indicators. The participants 
mentioned financial indicators such as revenue, costs, sales, losses, profit, and risk 
indicators such as staff attrition, fraud, and NPLs. P1 mentioned that in assessing the 
effectiveness of compensation strategies, the bank “looks at financial and risk indicators, 
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with risk indicators including measures such as staff attrition, fraud, and non-performing 
loans.” P1 noted that on the financial side, they consider “revenue, profitability, costs, 
especially the cost to income ratio to get a sense of the effectiveness of our compensation 
strategies.” P2 mentioned that they get a sense of how effective their compensation 
strategies are by “considering risk indicators such as staff attrition, staff satisfaction, 
fraud, the level of NPLs and financial indicators such as the bottom line.” P3 also 
mentioned that the bank uses “risk indicators such as staff attrition, staff satisfaction, 
operational losses, fraud, the level of NPLs.”  
P3 indicated that they “look at financial indicators that measure financial 
performance, including profit, losses, revenues, costs, essentially the bottom line.” P4 
mentioned that the bank has a monthly management risk committee that monitors risk 
indicators such as staff attrition, the level of NPLs, fraud and staff satisfaction and 
financial indicators such as sales, revenues, profile or loss, cost levels.” P5 also shared 
similar feedback indicating that the bank assesses the effectiveness of its compensation 
strategies through “several risk indicators such as staff attrition, staff satisfaction, NPLs, 
fraud and financial indicators such as sales, revenues, financial performance including 
profit, losses, costs.” Chou and Buchdadi (2017) posited that compensation strategies 
motivate managers in banks to achieve accounting-based performance risk and financial 
indicators such as NPL and return on asset because regulators focus on the accounting-
based performance measures for supervisory purposes. Firms that implement 
compensation strategies that rely on accounting performance risk and financial indicators 
encourage managers to ignore projects with high long-term market returns in favor of 
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projects that generate short-term accounting earnings (Kang & Nanda, 2017). All the 
participants mentioned the need to measure the effectiveness of compensation strategies 
using a set of risk indicators such as attrition, fraud, and NPLs as well as financial 
indicators such as revenue, costs, profit and losses in aligning with the long-term 
objectives of the institution. Following my analysis of the data from semistructured 
interviews and methodological triangulation, two subthemes emerged: (a) risk indicators, 
and (b) financial indicators. 
Subtheme 1: Risk indicators. All the participants mentioned risk indicators such 
as staff attrition, fraud, and NPLs as key measures of the effectiveness of compensation 
strategies if the measures align with the long-term objectives of the firm. Aldatmaz et al. 
(2017) advocated for the implementation of broad-based employee stock options (BBSO) 
to reduce employee turnover, strengthen risk management, and increase long-term firm 
performance. Petrou and Procopiou (2016) discovered that stock options regulate 
excessive managerial risk-taking, reduces earnings manipulation, and fraud. 
Nkundabanyanga et al. (2017) urged firms to implement effective risk management 
practices by setting performance targets that focus on the level of nonperforming loans 
rather than volume growth. Table 6 provides the key terms that refer to attrition, fraud, 
and NPLs key risk indicators for the effectiveness of a firm’s compensation strategies for 
all interviews, reflecting a combined frequency of 15.45% of all participant’s responses. 
Compensation committees need to ensure that firms compensate managers for achieving 








percentage     Similar words 
Risk 39 3.35 Risks 
Indicators 33 2.83 indicating, indication, indicator 
Attrition 31 2.66 Turnover 
Compensation 28 2.40 compensated, compensating 
Fraud 23 1.97 Frauds 
Loans 10 0.86 Loan 
Credit 08 0.69 drives, driving 
NPLs 08 0.69     asset quality 
 
All five executives mentioned staff attrition or turnover, staff fraud, and the level 
of NPLs as key risk measures for the effectiveness of a firm’s compensation strategy. P1 
mentioned that “a high staff attrition rate is a risk indicator to us that our compensation 
strategy may not be working as envisaged in light of what the competition is doing.” P1 
indicated that the “staff attrition rate is lower at some levels due to the pension scheme 
because of the level of certainty and assurance it gives to staff at that level.” P2 further 
noted that the “other risk indicators that measure the effectiveness of our compensation 
strategies include fraud and the level of NPLs.” P1 also highlighted “a reduction in fraud 
levels for some staff grades with the improvement in the salary structure giving staff 
more certainty in the bank's ability to support their growth and development aspirations.”  
P2 explained the importance of attrition as s risk measure noting that “if you are 
not adequately compensating your key personnel, they are going to jump ship, and you 
are going to lose your key talent to your competitors, and that may affect your strategic 
objectives.”  P2 indicated that staff attrition is one of the indicators the bank “worries 
about and monitors very closely understand what is going on in the market and what is 
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driving the numbers high.” P2 mentioned that in addition to staff attrition, the bank uses 
“other risk measures such as fraud, the level of NPLs.” P2 mentioned that “an increase in 
NPLs indicates that there are weaknesses in the underwriting standards because “sales 
teams are focusing on achieving their sales targets to maximize their sales commissions 
by driving volumes at the expense of asset quality.” 
P3 shared similar experiences with P1 and P2, noting that the bank considers 
“staff attrition, staff satisfaction, and other risk indicators such as operational losses, 
fraud, the level of NPLs.” P3 explained the relationship between compensation and asset 
quality noting that if  the approval of a loan depends on an employee’s underwriting 
signature, and the staff has [financial] problems, and the salary cannot help to sort out 
those financial problems, “they will approve poor quality loans in exchange for a 
kickback increasing the level of NPLs.” P3 confirmed that high NPLs might indicate that 
a firm’s compensation strategies are not effective noting that “when you deploy staff in 
sensitive roles, ensure they have the right integrity, but also make sure that you 
compensate them well, so that they do not yield to bribes and kickbacks to approve poor 
quality loans.” P3 mentioned that the bank uses other indicators such as fraud and staff 
attrition. P3 indicated that “staff attrition is one of the main risk indicators that your 
compensation strategy is not assisting you to retain your best talent.”  
P4 also mentioned that the bank tracks “risk measures such as staff attrition, the 
level of NPLs, fraud and staff satisfaction.” P4 noted that the bank considers both 
“voluntary and involuntary staff attrition to understand why people are leaving and if 
they are not happy with your compensation strategies, take appropriate actions to address 
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the challenges.” P5 mentioned that they look “at various measures, including staff 
attrition, staff satisfaction, NPLs, fraud.” According to P5, “retention or staff attrition 
ratios against the market are an effective indicator as to whether our compensation 
strategies are working or whether we need to make some changes.”  P5 added: “We 
monitor high performers that leave the bank and use the exit interviews to understand 
why a valuable staff is leaving the bank.” In my review of disclosures on remuneration in 
the annual reports of the participating financial institutions, I confirmed that banks 
implement pay-for-performance incentives that consider financial objectives as well as 
risk indicators such as staff fraud, operational losses, NPLs, and the staff level of 
compliance with bank procedures and values. 
Subtheme 2: Financial indicators. All the participants mentioned that financial 
performance indicators, such as revenue, costs, profit, and losses, indicate whether a 
firm’s compensation strategies are effective. Bennett et al. (2017) advised compensation 
committees to minimize pay-for-performance distortions by defining sales or profit 
targets relative to other firms. Firms need to measure by focusing on the firm’s actual and 
expected performance relative to the performance of benchmark peers (Shan & Walter, 
2016). Bova and Yang (2017) advised shareholders to mitigate the adverse impact of 
compensation strategies on firm performance by negotiating low wage rates to reduce 
marginal cost, increase profits and improve the entity’s competitive advantage ahead of 
its rivals. Table 7 provides the key terms that refer to the financial performance measures 
that participants mentioned as key in measuring the effectiveness of compensation 
strategies for all interviews, reflecting a combined frequency of 17.19% of all 
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participant’s responses. Risk management executives need to ensure that firms 
compensate managers for achieving both financial and risk performance-related measures 






percentage    Similar words 
Financial 10 5.73 - 
Revenue 08 2.70 Revenues 
Costs 07 2.70 Cost 
Indicators 07 2.38 Indicator 
Sales 05 1.41 - 
Losses 05 1.30 Loss 
Profit  05 0.97 Profitability 
 
All five executives mentioned the use of revenue, costs, sales, losses, and profits 
as financial measures in assessing the effectiveness of their compensation strategies. P1 
mentioned that in assessing whether the bank’s compensation strategies are effective, 
they consider measures such as “revenue, profitability, costs, especially the cost to 
income ratio.” P2 also mentioned that the bank looks at “revenues, sales, profit, cost 
level” in assessing the effectiveness of pay-for-performance incentives. P2 stated: “We 
had so many new accounts following a commission-based sales campaign, but when we 
looked at the numbers, almost 20% of the accounts were inactive shortly after the 
campaign.” P2 added: “When you have such a significant pool of inactive customers, it is 
an indication that your incentive scheme is not effective in driving the right performance 
behavior.” P2 mentioned that there is a between a firm’s compensation strategies and its 
financial year goals and objectives. P2 stated: “If you have sales, revenue, profit or loss 
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targets, your compensation strategy has to play a key role in enabling you to achieve 
these targets if it is effective.” To assess the effectiveness of compensation strategies, P3 
mentioned that they use “financial indicators that measure financial performance, 
including profit, losses, revenues, and costs.” P3 noted that the key deliverable for 
business functions is revenue and “if the compensation strategy does not incentivize staff 
effectively revenues for the bank will lag the set targets.” P3 mentioned that “for staff in 
support functions such as procurement or administration escalating costs is an indicator 
that the compensation strategy is not the right driving cost-saving behavior or that 
employees are engaging in fraud.”  
P3 indicated that for treasury functions, “the level of profit and losses is a good 
indicator of whether the bank’s compensation strategy is driving the right performance 
behavior.” P4 and P5 shared a similar experience with P3 noting that sales, revenues, 
profits or losses are a good indication as to whether compensation is driving the right 
behavior for business functions while “operating costs is a good indication as to whether 
compensation strategies are incentivizing support functions to manage costs 
appropriately. P4 stated: “We look at indicators such as sales, revenues, profit, loss, or 
cost levels depending on whether you are in business origination or you are a support 
function staff.”  P5 stated: “We look at financial indicators such as sales, revenues, 
financial performance including profit, losses for customer-facing staff and operating 
costs for support functions.”  A review of disclosures on remuneration and performance 
in the annual reports of the participating financial institutions confirmed that the banks 
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set annual objective performance targets including sales, revenues, costs, profits and 
losses and reward staff for meeting or exceeding these targets. 
Links to the literature. All the participants mentioned staff attrition, fraud, and 
NPLs as key measures of the effectiveness of compensation strategies if such measures 
align with the long-term objectives of the firm. Jia (2017) noted that compensation 
strategies might encourage financial misconduct in firms where executive turnover is 
high, top management executives are close to retirement and poor performance might 
result in the replacement of the top leadership team. Erkens et al. (2018) argued that firms 
that adopt clawbacks reduce compensation risk, improve financial reporting quality, and 
record low executive turnover if remuneration committees ensure that clawbacks do not 
penalize managers for non-controllable risks. Firms need to determine the appropriate 
level of fixed pay to attract or retain the best talent in the industry (Tóth, 2016). Jung and 
Subramanian (2017) noted that firms could use compensation strategies to attract or 
retain talented managers and to motivate them to work hard to increase shareholder value. 
Fichter (2016) noted the need for firms to use compensation strategies to strengthen 
ethical standards by providing incentives to employees who act with integrity 
consistently.  
Compensation committees need to consider managers’ moral values and intrinsic 
goals when designing incentive schemes because incentive-based compensation is not the 
sole source of staff motivation (Francoeur et al., 2015). Dittmann et al. (2017) 
encouraged firms to implement compensation strategies that encourage prudent risk-
taking behavior as well as reward managerial effort. Schoen (2016) noted that 
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compensation structures in banks that rewarded executives for positive returns without 
penalties for unethical behavior a matter contributed to the financial crisis of 2008. 
Cadman et al. (2016) posited that while several pay contracts reduce unethical managerial 
behavior, the contracts might motivate managers to invest in high-risk projects with large 
short-term returns to increase their remuneration on termination. 
All the participants mentioned that financial performance indicators, such as 
revenue, costs, profit, and losses, indicate whether a firm’s compensation strategies are 
effective. After the financial crisis of 2008, some loss-making banks paid bonuses to top 
managers contrary to risk management guidelines on pay-for-performance (Schenck & 
Thornton, 2016; Tóth, 2016). Compensation for top managers in many loss-making banks 
following the financial crisis stayed the same or increased regardless of risk, and firm 
performance (Boodoo, 2018; Eufinger & Gill, 2016). Bakke et al. (2016) discovered that 
when executives have a large portion of their wealth that depends on the future 
performance of the firm, they are risk-averse and increase their hedging intensity which 
increases the firm’s operating costs and reduces profits. Oluwagbemiga et al. (2016) 
posited that ERM practices, including risk limits, risk appetite, and risk strategy, restrain 
excessive managerial risk-taking behavior resulting in positive financial performance.  
Hirsch et al. (2017) cautioned firms against the potential unintended effects of 
clawbacks, including a risk-averse culture that inhibits growth and innovation. Leão et al. 
(2017) posited that compensation strategies that linked managerial bonuses to current 
year earnings and not on the firms’ long-term performance encouraged managers to take 
excessive risks. Raithatha and Komera (2016) urged firms to implement compensation 
117 
 
strategies that motivate managers to achieve market-based measures contrary to 
accounting results pay-for-performance expectations. Francis et al. (2017) argued that 
managerial compensation strategies that do not align the interests of shareholders and 
managers significantly increase the firms' exchange rate exposure impacting the entity’s 
financial performance and value. Omoregie and Kelikume (2017) implored shareholders 
and regulators to align compensation with performance to ensure that managers act in the 
best interest of all stakeholders. 
Links to the conceptual framework. The findings of this study emphasize the 
need for compensation committees to implement compensation strategies that motivate 
staff to achieve the long-term financial performance objectives of the firm as well as 
comply with the set risk appetite levels, and organizational values, norms, and ethical 
conduct. The findings are in line with the constructs of the theory of the firm, which is 
the conceptual framework of the study. According to the theory of the firm managers 
make decisions that appeal to their short-term interests, yet creditors and shareholders 
rely on the contractual agency relationship to protect their rights (Kang & Kim, 2016; 
Van Bekkum, 2016). Compensation strategies that reward managers for achieving the 
firm’s long-term financial and risk objectives help to align managers’ interests with other 
stakeholders’ interests. Kim et al. (2016) posited that debt and equity investors expect 
firms to implement effective corporate governance structures, including effective 
compensation structures that protect their interests from adverse decisions of managers.  
Koch et al. (2017) advised firms to implement effective employee retention 
policies to ensure that managers focus on the long-term performance of the firm in line 
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with shareholders’ interests. Compensation committees need to maintain a balance 
between risk-taking and risk-reducing incentives by aligning the firm’s risk-taking 
incentives with changes in the business and risk environment (Eufinger & Gill, 2016). 
The theory of the firm supports firms in implementing incentive schemes to encourage 
prudent managerial risk-taking behavior (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994). Cheng et al. 
(2015) advised regulators and policymakers to reduce the gap between the interests of 
managers and shareholders by implementing clawback practices to align executive 
compensation to the long-term performance objectives of the firm. The theory of the firm 
discusses ways of addressing the conflicting interests of stakeholders in a firm and the 
role of compensation in shaping managerial risk-taking behavior (Bellavitis et al., 2017; 
Clifford & Lindsey, 2016). The findings are consistent with the theory of the firm, which 
is the conceptual framework for this study. 
Theme 4: Effective Implementation of Compensation 
All the participants mentioned that effective governance and incorporation of risk-
based performance measures in performance framework are critical in mitigating 
compensation risks. P1 emphasized the role of management and board compensation 
committees in ensuring that firms roll out training and awareness programs on 
compensation. P1 stated: “The emphasis of our training and awareness program is to 
empower staff to understand their reward entitlements, the performance expectations of 
the bank to take ownership of their performance and reward.” P2 mentioned the need “for 
effective governance structures at board and management level to approve and oversee 
the implementation of the bank's compensation strategy is critical in addressing 
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compensation challenges and risks.” P3 noted that effective governance structures “foster 
objectivity, alignment of compensation with risk-based performance, transparency, 
equity, fairness, and objectivity of the compensation framework.” Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) argued that firms that implement effective corporate governance structures with a 
clear separation of roles between ownership and management are more likely to satisfy 
all stakeholders’ interests. The effective implementation of corporate governance 
structures, board oversight, and assurance are key tenets in addressing the agency 
problem (Mitnick, 1975).  
P5 emphasized the need for “the bank's compensation framework to reward risk-
based performance outcomes that match the long-term objectives of the bank.” Sitnikov 
et al. (2017) argued that firms that adopt the risk-based thinking approach under ISO 
9001:2015 empower managers to make rational risk management decisions in the interest 
of the investors. P4 acknowledged the importance of risk-based performance measures in 
implementing compensation strategies. P4 stated: “compensation has to reward staff for 
attaining risk-based performance goals of the bank in line with the long-term objectives 
of the bank.” Gatzert and Schmit (2015) advised firms to adopt compensation strategies 
that foster accountability and reward prudent managerial risk-taking behavior. All the 
participants mentioned the need to ensure effective implementation of compensation 
strategies through effective governance structures and adopting risk-based performance 
measures in compensation structures. Following my analysis of the data from 
semistructured interviews and methodological triangulation, two subthemes emerged: (a) 
effective governance, and (b) risk-based performance measures. 
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Subtheme 1: Effective governance. All the participants mentioned that effective 
governance structures, including independent management and board committees, are 
important in implementing compensation strategies that drive prudent risk management 
behavior. Kumari et al. (2017) posited that the components of a good corporate 
governance framework include separation of roles and responsibilities between managers 
and owners, board independence, risk management oversight committees, audit 
committees, and independent remuneration committees. Effective governance 
mechanisms mitigate agency risk by aligning the interests of all stakeholders of a firm, 
including managers, owners, creditors, suppliers, customers, and the public (Outa & 
Waweru, 2016).  
Good corporate governance practices, including an independent board, board 
members’ expertise, and experience, strengthen internal control, and risk management 
practices in firms (Nalukenge et al., 2016). Table 8 provides the key terms that refer to 
the impact of effective governance on compensation strategies for all interviews, 
reflecting a combined frequency of 10.85% of all participant’s responses. Regulators and 
policymakers need to ensure the presence of effective governance structures in firms to 
oversee the effective implementation of compensation strategies that promote prudent 
managerial risk-taking decisions. All five executives mentioned the need for effective 









percentage    Similar words 
Governance 31 1.74 - 
Management 27 1.52 manager, managers, managing 
Committee 24 1.35 Committees 
Board 23 1.29 - 
Performance 22 1.24 perform, performers 
Effective 19 1.07 Effectiveness 
Reward 19 1.07 rewarding, rewards 
Structure 15 0.84      structured, structures 
Ensuring 13 0.73      ensure, ensures 
 
P1 noted the importance of governance structures such as “management and 
board committees to oversee the implementation of compensation strategies in the bank.” 
P2 shared the same experience noting that “ensuring the presence of effective governance 
structures at board and management level to approve and oversee the implementation of 
the bank's compensation strategy is critical in addressing compensation challenges and 
risks.” P2 stated: “For the senior management staff we have a compensation committee at 
board level that [oversees] the rewarding of people based on the long-term goals of the 
bank as opposed to rewarding short-term performance.” P2 noted that “board-level 
compensation committees approve and supervise the implementation of compensation to 
ensure transparency, equity, and fairness in compensation.” P3 underscored the 
importance of effective governance concerning the presence of comprehensive policies 
and procedures to guide the effective implementation of compensation strategies.  
P3 stated: “There is a need for effective governance structures including 
management and board committees, policies, procedures and guidelines on compensation 
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to foster objectivity, alignment, transparency and equity in the compensation process.” P5 
also shared a similar experience noting that “from a governance perspective, 
comprehensive policies, procedures, and compensation guidelines encourage people to 
operate in line with the bank’s expectations.”  P3 also noted the need for an independent 
oversight committee of the board to determine and approve compensation for oversight 
functions, including risk management, compliance, and audit. P3 stated: “Because of the 
kind of work, they do, there should be an independent body that determines their 
compensation and even when the CEO approves their compensation, these committees 
should independently assess the reasonableness of their compensation.” P5 also 
mentioned the need for the “governance structures to ensure that an independent 
oversight committee determines and approves compensation for risk and compliance 
functions to enable them to do their work independently.” 
P4 mentioned that effective governance is critical in ensuring the effective 
implementation of compensation strategies by fostering transparency, equity, objectivity, 
and fairness. P4 stated: “For instance, in our monthly senior management meetings, we 
review a report on the payout on incentive schemes to see how many people earned the 
incentive and the percentage they earn to ensure fairness.” P4 observed that effective 
governance structures in the form of clear policies, procedures, and guidelines as well as 
constituted management and board committees are key in driving equity and objectivity 
in compensation. P4 stated: “We have a lot of support for the risk assurance or control 
teams because the board and management ensure that audit, compliance and risk teams 
are fairly staffed and remunerated to be able to perform their independent assurance 
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roles.” P5 emphasized the importance of effective management and board committees 
with a clear policy framework on compensation in ensuring transparency and equity in 
the implementation of compensation strategies. P5 stated: “In our case bonus serves to 
reward and incentivize excellent performers especially in the business functions 
following objective self-assessments, line manager review, input from the moderation 
committee and final approval by the board compensation committee.”  
P5 noted the need for improvements to strengthen the governance process. P5 
noted the need “for providing timely feedback to line managers, especially in cases where 
the moderation committee makes compensation to update staff immediately to foster 
transparency.” P2, P3, and P4 emphasized the need for a governance framework for the 
periodic review of compensation to ensure that it is appropriate. P2 stated: “Our 
governance framework requires the annual review of compensation including peer 
reviews to ensure that our compensation is competitive.” P3 stated: “We conduct and 
participate in periodic market surveys on salaries and benefits, and you can see that the 
best banks in retaining talent are the ones that participate in those surveys.” P4 mentioned 
that the bank conducts quarterly staff engagement surveys and market surveys to assess 
their compensation packages against the competition and take appropriate action. In my 
review of disclosures on remuneration in the annual reports of the participating financial 
institutions, I confirmed that banks have board-level compensation committees 
responsible for oversight on the effective implementation of compensation strategies. 
Subtheme 2: Risk-based performance measures. All the participants mentioned 
that compensation strategies need to reward employees for meeting the set financial 
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performance targets while complying with the bank’s set risk measures and the long-term 
goals of the organization. Firms with effective risk management capabilities maintain a 
competitive edge over rivals by making the right decisions regarding risk acceptance, 
risk-adjusted returns, risk and reward, risk-pricing, and capital adequacy levels (Guill, 
2016). Regulators need to ensure that firms define the appropriate behavioral 
expectations and monitor to ensure compliance with the set risk culture (McCormack & 
Deacon, 2017). ERM practices including risk limits, risk appetite, and risk strategy 
business leaders, restrain excessive managerial risk-taking behavior resulting in positive 
financial performance (Oluwagbemiga et al., 2016).  
ERM requires firms to adopt the balanced scorecard tool to track their 
performance against the approved risk appetite (Karanja, 2017; Karanja, E, 2016). Table 
9 provides the key terms that refer to risk-based performance measures in implementing 
compensation strategies for all interviews, reflecting a combined frequency of 21.07% of 
all participants’ responses. Risk management executives need to incorporate risk 
measures in the performance management system to ensure that employee remuneration 
considers the employee’s performance regarding financial and risk performance 
measures. All five executives mentioned the need to incorporate risk-based performance 
measures in the compensation framework to ensure that banks incentivize employees to 






Risk-Based Performance Measures 
Reference Frequency 
Weighted 
percentage     Similar words 
Risk 67 5.76 Risks 
Performance 48 4.13 - 
Compensation 28 2.41 - 
Measures 27 2.32 measurable, measure, measured 
Term 21 1.81 - 
Long 17 1.46 - 
Driving 14 1.20 drive, drives,  
Align 13 1.12 aligned, aligning, alignment, aligns 
Rewards 10 0.86 rewarded, rewarding, rewards 
 
P1 emphasized the need to incorporate risk-based performance measures in the 
compensation framework to drive the right behavior. P1 stated: “On the variable side we 
have pay-for-performance benefits such as bonus and sales commission that track risk-
based performance measures in line with the long-term goals of the bank to drive the 
right behavior.” P1 mentioned that “for business functions employees earn a reward for 
bringing in new accounts or loans but also for the quality of those accounts or loans and 
in this case account dormancy, account balances, and non-performing loans are key risk-
based performance measures.” P2 mentioned that the compensation structure 
incorporated risk-based measures to drive the right behavior. P2 stated: “Everyone has a 
scorecard for performance evaluation, and in the scorecard, we have risk-based 
performance measures that capture risk and conduct performance such as the employee’s 
compliance with the policies and procedures of the bank.” P2 also indicated that the 
incorporation of risk in compensation strategies helps to drive the right employee 
behavior. P2 stated: “Our focus is to align our compensation with clear risk-based 
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performance measures, and we hope to able to see prudent risk-taking behavior and 
sustainable results.” P2 added: “We need to see more active accounts and less dormant 
accounts, and fewer customer complaints as these are good risk indicators of sustainable 
performance.” P3 mentioned the need to incorporate risk measures in the compensation 
framework to drive the right risk-taking for business functions.  
P3 stated: “The board or senior management should align compensation with the 
long-term objectives of the bank setting rolling targets to manage the risk where 
employees meet their financial targets ahead of time and stop working.” P3 emphasized 
the need to implement pay-for-performance compensation strategies that align 
compensation to risk-based performance measures that support the long term, sustainable 
objectives of the firm. P3 stated: “For example, performance-based bonuses need to 
reward employees for meeting the long-term goals of the business with clawback 
measures in the future if there are breaches regarding the risk and conduct measures.” P3 
also mentioned that the bank focuses on rewarding employees for risk-based sustainable 
performance. P3 indicated: “If it is up to the managing director, they would prefer bonus 
based on revenue while the board would prefer that compensation committees pay 
bonuses based on profitability.”  
P4 underscored the role of risk-based performance measures in compensation. P4 
stated: “What we have done to strengthen our compensation framework is to incorporate 
risk-based performance measures in our compensation framework to encourage long-
term risk-taking behavior.” P4 added: “Our incentive schemes have a good balance 
between the risk management and business development for staff in the first line, so there 
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is no incentive scheme that purely rewards the generation of business without due 
consideration of the risk appetite.” P4 further explained: “In the incentive scheme say for 
loan generation, we will look at how many loans they are bringing in, and the quality of 
those loans and those two aspects have weights and both feed into how much you will 
earn.” P4 added: “In fact, it is so risk-sensitive that if the quality of the loans you are 
bringing in does not meet the minimum requirements, you will not get an incentive and 
so asset quality is a key risk measure.”  
P5 also shared similar insights on the importance of balancing risk and reward in 
compensation frameworks. P5 stated: “We promote a risk-based performance-based 
culture and reward staff for meeting the set risk-based performance outcomes with a 
focus on attracting and retaining staff of good risk conduct and excellent performance.” 
P5 added: “We have a risk appetite framework in place including risk limits, such as 
stop-loss limits for the treasury teams which are in the scorecards to drive staff 
performance while operating within the set risk appetite.”  P5 emphasized: “The bank’s 
compensation strategy does not encourage the taking of risks beyond the set risk 
tolerance levels.” I reviewed disclosures on remuneration and performance in the annual 
reports of the participating financial institutions and confirmed that the bank’s 
performance management systems incorporate financial and risk measures to use 
compensation to drive long-term sustainable performance. 
Links to the literature. All the participants mentioned that effective governance 
structures, such as board and management committees, as well as policies and 
procedures, are key aspects of an effective compensation framework. Corporate 
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governance refers to the set of rules, norms, and guidelines that firms implement in 
defining roles and responsibilities between managers and owners (Anginer et al., 2016). 
Pan et al. (2017) posited that a firm’s corporate risk culture shapes the effectiveness of its 
corporate governance and risk management practices and plays a key role in coordinating 
and regulating the choice of risk and control decisions. Regulations and effective 
corporate governance structures are important in moderating managerial risk-taking 
behavior (Alzoubi, 2017; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2016; Trendowski & Rustambekov, 
2017). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision advised firms to constitute the 
board of directors to oversee the effective implementation of the firm’s compensation 
strategies, review compensation policies annually, approve senior management 
compensation and ensure that incentives align with risk implications over a multi-year 
financial performance period (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015).  
Chen and Qiu (2016) advised the board of directors to consider the firm’s long-
term relationship with its creditors by managing information asymmetry to reduce 
financing costs when designing compensation strategies. Shareholders and boards need to 
manage compensation risk by ensuring that remuneration committees have independent, 
competent, and qualified members with specific roles and responsibilities (Kang & 
Nanda, 2017). Executive compensation risk is lower if an affiliated banker director is on 
the remuneration committee of the board due to a good appreciation of the pay-for-
performance principle (Kang & Kim, 2016). Firms need to constitute compensation 
committees responsible for ensuring that managers’ incentives align with the banks’ 
culture, long-term goals, risk appetite, performance, and the control environment (Correa 
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& Lel, 2016). Independent board committees with few and competent members are 
effective at monitoring performance and restraining excessive risk-taking behavior by 
moderating executive compensation (Słomka-Gołębiowska & Urbanek, 2016). Effective 
remuneration committees take accountability for fair remuneration decisions and foster a 
culture of transparency in disclosing executive remuneration decisions to external 
stakeholders of the firm (Kanapathippillai et al., 2017). 
All the participants underscored the need for compensation strategies and 
performance management systems to reward employees for achieving an optimum mix of 
financial and conduct risk performance measures to drive long-term sustainable 
performance. Firms with a mature ERM culture record higher earnings, return on assets, 
return on equity than their industry peers to the benefit of all the stakeholders (Callahan 
& Soileau, 2017). The key features of an effective ERM framework include a mature risk 
culture, voluntary compliance, transparency in sharing risk information, competent staff, 
and top management support for risk matters (Ahmed & Ndayisaba, 2016). Storer (2016) 
emphasized the need to focus on ethics, training, stress testing, scenario thinking, 
compensation, and consequence management in developing organizational risk culture 
frameworks. Regulators need to promote an industry-wide risk culture that encourages 
honesty, integrity, transparency, and prudence (Sheedy & Griffin, 2017).  
Firms might achieve positive managerial risk-taking behavior by ensuring that 
compensation contracts align risk-taking incentives at different levels in the firm and 
recruiting managers that match the firm’s risk culture (Pan et al., 2017). Strong corporate 
risk culture is the basis for a risk management framework that drives prudent risk 
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management behavior (Wood & Lewis, 2017). The top leadership at Société Générale 
ignored breaches in internal controls because risky trading practices were profitable, 
highlighting the role of leaders in instituting a culture of good ethical conduct, 
governance, and risk management practices (Baker et al., 2017). Clawbacks drive the 
right behavior by exposing bank executives to future potential losses of pay due to 
unethical behavior, misconduct, poor managerial oversight, and excessive risk-taking 
(Kroos et al., 2017). Compensation strategies with strong clawback provisions 
disincentivize managers from investing in high-risk projects due to the adverse impact on 
their future compensation (Glover & Levine, 2017). Firms might use equity-based 
compensation ahead of cash-based compensation strategies to encourage a decision-
making culture that underscores the long-term interests of investors and shareholders 
(Brockman & Salas, 2016). 
Links to the conceptual framework. The findings in this study underscore the 
role of effective governance structures in the effective compensation of compensation 
strategies by fostering transparency, fairness, and protecting the interests of all 
stakeholders of the firm. The findings align with the constructs of the theory of the firm, 
which is the conceptual framework of this study to the extent that the findings emphasize 
the implementation of structures that regulate the separation of roles and responsibilities 
and the alignment of managers’ interests with the long-term interests of the shareholders. 
The theory of the firm explores why managers in firms with debt and equity holders 
undertake riskier projects (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kim et al., 2016). According to the 
theory of the firm managers in the firm make decisions that appeal to their short-term 
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interests, yet creditors and shareholders rely on the contractual agency relationship to 
protect their rights (Kang & Kim, 2016; Van Bekkum, 2016). According to the constructs 
of the theory of the firm corporate governance structures that emphasize the separation of 
ownership from control are effective in protecting the interests of outside stakeholders 
(Fama, 1980). Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) drew insights from the theory of the firm to 
encourage remuneration committees to implement incentive schemes that align reward to 
the long-term performance of the projects. The findings align with the theory of the firm, 
which is the conceptual framework of this study regarding the need to reward employees 
for achieving the long-term objectives of the firm. 
Applications to Professional Practice 
The findings from this study provide useful insights on compensation strategies 
that support effective risk management practices. Insights from the participants 
demonstrated that firms implement a combination of non-financial and financial forms of 
compensation structures to drive managerial risk-taking behavior. Findings from the 
study suggest that financial compensation is not a sustainable form of compensation in 
motivating staff and driving sustainable performance, underscoring the need to 
supplement financial compensation with non-monetary forms of reward. According to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), monetary incentives may not drive sustainable 
performance because they do not have a significant impact on the managers’ level of 
sacrifice, dedication, honesty, and professionalism. Business leaders can motivate staff to 
contribute to the long-term objectives of the firm using a combination of non-financial 
and financial forms of compensation, including fixed and variable incentives, while 
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noting that each strategy impacts employees differently. An optimum level of fixed and 
variable incentives aligns stakeholder interests and resolves conflicts of interests between 
the various parties (Chen & Qiu, 2016; Tóth, 2016).  
Findings indicate that while fixed financial compensation provides staff with the 
assurance of a stable, minimum level of earning and promotes prudent risk-taking 
behavior, such forms of compensation do not incentivize staff to increase performance. 
Whereas variable pay-for-performance financial compensation drives the right 
performance behavior for business functions, these incentives can encourage excessive 
risk-taking behavior unless the structure rewards staff for achieving the firm’s set long-
term risk-based performance objectives. Sisli-Ciamarra and Savaser (2016) cautioned that 
pay-for-performance incentives could induce more risk-taking, arguing that risky projects 
create more value and increase the expected value of incentive compensation. The 
findings draw business leaders’ attention to the unintended consequences of 
compensation strategies in driving excessive risk-taking behavior as managers exploit the 
reward structure to maximize their earnings. With intense competition and rivalry as 
banks offer hefty compensation packages to attract and retain talent, the findings 
underscore the need for business leaders to manage the escalating employee costs by 
offering competitive but affordable incentives. 
The findings call on regulators and policymakers to implement regulatory 
measures that strengthen effective governance in firms to implement compensation 
strategies that drive prudent managerial risk-taking behavior. The board, regulators, and 
assurance functions need to monitor the changes in managers’ risk preferences from the 
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time of joining the firm to when they get closer to retirement to ensure that appropriate 
compensation strategies are in place to drive the right behavior (Alzoubi, 2017; Croci et 
al., 2016). According to the results from this study compensation committees need to 
measure the effectiveness of compensation strategies through a set of financial and 
indicators. Insights from the study indicate that financial indicators such as revenues, 
sales, costs, profits, losses and risk indicators including staff attrition, fraud, and NPLs, 
can provide business leaders with an indication of whether the firm’s compensation 
strategies are effective.  
The results underscore the role of effective governance structures such as 
management and board-level committees in implementing compensation strategies that 
drive prudent risk management behavior. Compensation committees need to ensure that 
compensation strategies comprise both fixed and variable components and to adjust 
variable incentives in response to managerial risk-taking behavior (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2015). The findings suggest that governance structures, including 
policies and procedures, provide oversight regarding compensation to ensure 
transparency, fairness, equity, and protect the interests of all stakeholders of the firm. 
Business leaders need to implement effective objective setting, performance 
measurement, and reward systems to ensure the long-term alignment of interests between 
owners, creditors, and managers (Evans & Tourish, 2016).  
The results indicate that compensation committees play a key role in ensuring that 
compensation strategies and performance management systems reward employees for 
meeting both the financial and conduct risk performance objectives of the firm. This 
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study underscores the importance of incorporating risk-based performance measures in 
the compensation framework to incentivize employees to achieve the set financial 
performance targets while complying with the bank’s set risk appetite. The findings draw 
business leaders’ attention in using compensation strategies to motivate staff to achieve 
the long-term financial performance objectives of the firm as well as comply with the set 
risk appetite levels, organizational values, norms, and ethical conduct. Compensation 
structures that align managers’ and shareholders’ interests reduce risk-taking incentives, 
improve the firm’s cost of borrowing, optimize incentive-based capital requirements, and 
increase shareholder value (Eufinger & Gill, 2016). 
Implications for Social Change 
The findings from this study may contribute to positive social change by sharing 
insights on compensation strategies that support effective risk management practices in 
banks. The adoption of compensation strategies that reward managers for taking prudent 
risk decisions may contribute to financial stability resulting in positive social benefits 
including (a) protection of depositors’ funds, (b) improving financial inclusion by 
extending affordable financial services to businesses and individuals, and (c) inculcating 
a good savings and investment culture. Insights from the study may drive the adoption of 
compensation strategies that motivate leaders to focus on the long-term objectives of the 
firm, including the investment in corporate social responsibility initiatives that benefit 
communities. The adoption of risk-based compensation strategies might contribute to 
financial sustainability, enabling firms to contribute to financing community projects 
over the long-term. Financially sound banks improve the welfare of the communities in 
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which they operate by investing in socially responsive projects in key public services 
such as health, education, infrastructure, and sports. 
Recommendations for Action 
Business leaders can use insights from this study to implement compensation 
strategies that support effective risk management strategies. The findings from the study 
draw help managers in appreciating some of the unintended consequences of 
compensation. The results highlight ways in which managers can mitigate compensation 
risks and use compensation as a competitive strategy to attract, retain, and motivate staff 
to achieve sustainable firm performance. Some specific recommendations may benefit 
business leaders. These include: (a) implement compensation strategies that emphasize 
both non-financial and financial forms of compensation (b) adopt compensation strategies 
that comprise both fixed and variable financial compensation strategies, (c) establish 
financial and risk indicators to assess the effectiveness of compensation strategies, (d) 
embed risk-based performance measures in compensation strategies, (e) adopt effective 
corporate governance structures to oversee the implementation of compensation 
strategies, (f) institute comprehensive compensation policies and procedures to guide the 
uniform implementation of incentive schemes across the firm; (g) ensure the independent 
oversight and approval of compensation packages for assurance functions such as risk, 
compliance and audit. Regulators, policymakers, and other managers, including human 
resources, may find the findings in this study beneficial in designing compensation 
frameworks that can attract, retain, and drive the right employee behavior. I will 
communicate findings from this study through several forums, including business 
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conferences, seminars, and other knowledge-sharing or training sessions that focus on 
effective risk management practices or compensation. I will disseminate the results 
through publication in scholarly and business journals. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore compensation strategies 
that some executives in Uganda use to support effective risk management practices. 
Using methodological triangulation, I identified four themes regarding compensation 
strategies that support commercial banks’ effective risk management practices. The 
themes include (a) compensation challenges, (b) financial and non-financial 
compensation, (c) the effectiveness of compensation, and (d) effective implementation of 
compensation. The focus of the study was to explore compensation strategies that drive 
prudent managerial risk-taking behavior in commercial banks in Uganda. The first 
limitation of this multiple case study was that the sample size might not represent all 
commercial banks in Uganda. This study is a multiple case study of five commercial 
banks in Uganda, which presents a limitation in the transferability of the findings to other 
contexts or the banking industry Uganda, in the emerging or developed markets. I 
recommend that future researchers include non-commercial banking institutions such as 
micro-finance banks, as well as financial technology companies such as mobile money 
transfer firms as this could result in different findings. Users of the study’s findings 
should exercise caution in generalizing these findings.  
The second limitation was that participants might withhold certain information 
that banks consider competitive and may not respond to the interview questions honestly 
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and truthfully. I recommend that future researchers work with financial institutions that 
have regulatory obligations to publish their financial statements due to the comprehensive 
disclosures on compensation in the reports which aid methodological triangulation. The 
findings indicate the importance of non-financial compensation in motivating staff and 
managing staff attrition. Future researchers could focus on the impact of non-monetary 
forms of compensation in motivating staff and driving prudent managerial risk-taking 
behavior. The results from the study indicate the need for a committee of the board to 
determine and approve compensation packages of assurance functions such as risk 
management, compliance, and internal audit to protect their independence. Future 
researchers could focus on exploring compensation strategies that motivate assurance 
functions to perform their risk oversight roles effectively.  
Reflections 
The major insight from the doctoral study process was my appreciation of the 
virtues of independent scholarship, including (a) self-supervision, (b) sacrifice, (c) 
perseverance, and (e) patience. While accustomed to providing review feedback in my 
professional role, the DBA journey exposed me to the challenging process of receiving 
and comprehending constructive feedback from my peers and faculty. The doctoral 
journey equipped me with research and scholarly writing skills that I am using in my 
professional and personal work. Despite the several challenges, including the high 
demand for my family time, the benefits from the process were worth every sacrifice. As 
a risk management professional, my choice of research topic was easy because of my 
conviction that compensation was at the heart of several financial scandals globally. The 
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DBA program gave me access to the most recent research on ERM practices and 
compensation frameworks, which broadened my knowledge and appreciation of the 
relationship between compensation and risk management.  
As part of the doctoral study process, I was privileged to interact with my peer 
risk management professionals who challenged my thought process and biases on 
compensation strategies that drive prudent managerial risk-taking behavior. I was 
surprised at the importance of non-monetary forms of compensation in driving the 
managerial risk-taking behavior. The insights from the study exposed me to recent 
practices regarding compensation strategies that support effective risk management 
practices in the banking sector. I cherish the professional relationships built, and I hope to 
leverage on these going forward as we collaborate as risk peers to ensure that we perform 
our second line of defense roles effectively. I was honored to research a topic that is 
current and relevant to my profession and whose findings might assist business leaders in 
implementing compensation strategies that drive sustainable performance. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore compensation strategies 
that some executives in Uganda use to support effective risk management practices. The 
study adds to the growing body of scholarly literature compensation strategies that 
support commercial banks’ effective risk management practices. The findings highlight 
the need for firms to implement compensation strategies that emphasize both non-
financial and financial forms of compensation, including fixed and variable reward 
structures. The findings underscore the need to establish financial and risk indicators to 
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assess the effectiveness of compensation strategies and embed risk-based performance 
measures in compensation strategies. Firms need to institute comprehensive 
compensation policies and procedures to guide the uniform implementation of incentive 
schemes across the firm and ensure the independent oversight and approval of 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
1. What risks, if any, does your organization face from its compensation 
strategies? 
2. What compensation strategies have you implemented to support effective risk 
management practices? 
3. How do you measure the effectiveness of these compensation strategies? 
4. What were the key challenges your organization encountered when 
implementing these compensation strategies? 
5. How were the key challenges in implementing these compensation strategies 
addressed? 
6. What additional information would you like to share concerning compensation 
strategies and effective risk management practices? 
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
What You Will Do What You Will Say: Script 
(a) Introduce the 
interview and set the 
stage. 
(b) It is ideal for 
interviewing over a 
light meal or coffee. 
Hello. My name is Elias Kagumya, and currently a doctoral student in 
the Doctor of Business Administration program at Walden University. 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in the study aimed at 
exploring “Compensation Strategies That Support Commercial 
Banks’ Effective Risk Management Practices.” Please note that the 
interview will be recorded and is confidential. 
(a) Pay attention to 
nonverbal cues. 
(b) Paraphrase where 
appropriate. 
(c) Do not interject. 
(d) Maintain eye 
contact. 
(e) Listen with interest. 
(f) Ask follow-up 
probing questions to 
obtain in-depth 
responses. 
1. What risks, if any, does your organization face from its 
compensation strategies? 
2. What compensation strategies have you implemented to support 
effective risk management practices? 
3. How do you measure the effectiveness of these compensation 
strategies? 
4. What were the key challenges your organization encountered 
when implementing these compensation strategies? 
5. How were the key challenges in implementing these 
compensation strategies addressed? 
6. What additional information would you like to share concerning 
compensation strategies and effective risk management practices? 
Wrap up interview and 
thank participant. 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in the study. 
Schedule and confirm a 
date when the participant 
will receive a follow-up 
member checking e-
mail. 
I will review the recording of this interview and provide you with a 
summary of my understanding of your answers to each question. I 
kindly request you to confirm by e-mail if the information is accurate 
and whether I missed any information. You will also be able to clarify 
any issue as well as provide any additional information.  
Follow-up Member Checking 
Ensure member 
checking by sending an 
e-mail to participants 
with a succinct synthesis 
for each question.  
I have reviewed the recording of the interview and provide below my 
comprehension of each question from your responses as per the 
recorded transcripts. Kindly confirm by e-mail if this information is 
correct. Please let me know if I have missed anything or of any 
additional information you would like me to include. 
1. Question and succinct synthesis of the interpretation – 
perhaps one paragraph or as needed. 
2. Question and succinct synthesis of the interpretation – 
perhaps one paragraph or as needed. 
3. Question and succinct synthesis of the interpretation – 
perhaps one paragraph or as needed. 
4. Question and succinct synthesis of the interpretation – 
perhaps one paragraph or as needed. 
5. Question and succinct synthesis of the interpretation – 
perhaps one paragraph or as needed. 
6. Question and succinct synthesis of the interpretation – 
perhaps one paragraph or as needed. 
 
